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This research analyzes the presidential rhetoric employed to communicate the Bush Doctrine foreign policy 
objectives to the American public in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks until the declaration of war on Iraq. 
Strategic and ideological interests are quantified utilizing content analysis data collected from foreign policy 
speeches that President Bush delivered from September 11, 2001, to March 19, 2003. The data and speeches are 
evaluated to classify the Bush grand strategy as realist, liberal or neoconservative and to determine whether the Bush 
Doctrine represents change or continuity in US foreign policy. Surveys from March 2003 are included to assess the 
impact of presidential rhetoric on public opinion. These results contribute to the debate surrounding the Bush 












In the post-Cold War world, the US emerged as a global superpower after its victory over 
the Soviet Union. This led to a shift in the international power balance and a domestic debate 
regarding the appropriate role for the US in the global community. The debate intensified after 
9/11, a national trauma that prompted the Bush Administration to implement a grand strategy in 
response to an attack on American soil, balancing strategic and ideological interests at home and 
abroad. The grand strategy of President George W. Bush, encompassed in the Bush Doctrine, is 
one of the most criticized foreign policy strategies among political scholars and the American 
public. The Bush Doctrine significantly influenced US foreign policy pursuits in the Middle 
East, specifically the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterterrorism strategies and democracy 
promotion efforts.  
Three central debates surrounding the Bush Administration grand strategy have emerged 
in foreign policy literature: First, should the Bush Doctrine be theoretically classified as a realist, 
liberal or neoconservative grand strategy based on its balance between strategic and ideological 
interests? Second, which rhetorical strategies did the Bush Administration employ in order to 
generate public support for foreign policy decisions and were these strategies successful? And 
finally, does the Bush Doctrine represent change or continuity in US foreign policy? 
In “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Robert Jervis identifies the four main pillars of 
the Bush grand strategy, which provide the basis of analysis for this research:  
1. Democracy and Liberalism;  
2. Threat and Preventive War; 
3. Unilateralism; and  
4. American Hegemony (Jervis 2003).  
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Some scholars emphasize the Bush Doctrine’s realist features due to its focus on security 
interests, while others analyze liberal and neoconservative trends reflected in President Bush’s 
rhetorical emphasis on American ideals. Based on their assessments regarding the interplay of 
strategic and ideological interests, scholars argue that the Bush Doctrine either represents a 
departure from foreign policy trends or a continuation of foreign policy traditions.  
In order to more thoroughly address these debates, this research utilizes content analysis 
on a collection of President Bush’s foreign policy statements delivered from the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, to the declaration of the war on Iraq on March 19, 2003, a formative era 
in the development of the Bush Doctrine. By identifying strategic and ideological word 
indicators and calculating their recurrence throughout 59 speeches, the content analysis data 
quantifies the prevalence of strategic and ideological interests in the Bush Doctrine. The data 
reveals that strategic interests were predominant in President Bush’s foreign policy statements, 
indicating that the Bush Doctrine should be classified as realist.  
The content of these speeches yields insight into the rhetorical strategies that the Bush 
Administration employed and the impact of presidential rhetoric on public opinion. Surveys 
conducted in March 2003 demonstrate that the Bush Administration enjoyed high public 
approval ratings, indicating that President Bush’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify strategic 
objectives successfully garnered domestic support for the Bush Doctrine. This research 
concludes by analyzing the National Security Strategies of the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
Administrations to contextualize the Bush Doctrine and to determine whether this grand strategy 
represents change or continuity in US foreign policy. Overall, the Bush Doctrine exemplifies 
continuity in US grand strategy, but a change in the policies implemented to achieve foreign 





Part I: US Grand Strategy and Strategic Adjustment in the Post-Cold War World  
 	   The Bush Doctrine can be best understood as the Bush Administration’s grand strategy. 
In Reluctant Crusaders, Colin Dueck discusses grand strategy as the theoretical basis of US 
foreign policy and specifically analyzes the Bush Doctrine (Dueck 2006). Dueck explores the 
factors that influence US grand strategy as well as the balance between strategic and ideological 
interests (Dueck 2006). He defines grand strategy as “the prioritization of foreign policy goals, 
the identification of existing and potential resources, and the selection of a plan or roadmap that 
uses those resources to meet those goals” (Dueck 2006: 1). Grand strategies must outline specific 
policy guidelines for “levels of defense spending, foreign aid, alliance behavior, and troop 
deployments,” which in turn shape American military, political, diplomatic and economic 
engagements abroad (Dueck 2006: 1, 10, 11). 	  
Two competing theories of international relations have historically influenced the 
development of US grand strategy and are especially relevant in discussing the interplay of 
strategic and ideological interests within the Bush Doctrine. The realist grand strategy tradition 
claims, “the world is a dangerous place characterized by international anarchy, the conflicting 
interests of states, and flawed human nature” (David 2006: 615). According to realism, states 
will augment national military, political and economic power in the absence of a dominant global 
ruler (Bowman 2005-2006: 92). Therefore, states must constantly prepare for potential attacks 
and focus on “short term and security-related interests” (Mowle 2003: 567). Realism suggests 
that alliances should be utilized to determine “the future distribution of national capabilities” and 
address immediate national interests (Mowle 2003: 569). Yet realist grand strategists argue that 
nations should not rely solely on partnerships to confront international challenges due to the 
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importance of national independence, as threats “must be addressed with or without assistance” 
(Mowle 2003: 569).  
In contrast, liberalism promotes “individual freedom, equality of right, majority rule, 
progress, enterprise, the rule of law, and the strict limits of the state” (Dueck 2006: 21). Liberal 
scholars believe that because elected officials of democratic governments will be held 
accountable by the electoral system, they will preserve individual liberties for citizens and 
uphold liberal values within the global arena (Bowman 2005-2006: 22). The democratic peace 
theory, which proposes that “domestic political constraints…and free market economic ties” 
prevent democracies from fighting each other, is essential to liberalism (Bowman 2005-2006: 
92-93). The US has a long tradition of promoting democratic ideals to achieve a “more liberal 
international order” (Dueck 2006: 22). Liberal grand strategies prioritize alliances and emphasize 
multilateral cooperation in the international community, even without clearly defined shared 
interests (Mowle 2003: 569). Adherence to international norms is also crucial, as liberalism 
dictates that states should promote such norms in the global community; thus states are likely to 
“defer to the group decision on actions to be taken, even if that decision is not the state’s ideal 
policy choice” (Mowle 2003: 569).  
US grand strategy has vacillated between realist and liberal tendencies throughout 
history. Dueck characterizes these shifts in US grand strategy as “strategic adjustment,” which 
signify changes in American “strategy capabilities and commitments” (Dueck 2006: 12). These 
changes lead the US to enhance or minimize its influence abroad and alter its alliances (Dueck 
2006: 12). This adjustment may additionally realign the balance between strategic and 
ideological interests and shift US grand strategy towards more realist or liberal policies (Dueck 
2006: 37). External shocks or administration changes may challenge US grand strategy, 
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particularly when a “sense of policy failure” is perceived (Dueck 2006: 37). Although war or 
global crisis would constitute an external shock, new threats to American security may also 
provide an impetus for strategic adjustment (Dueck 2006: 37). A first order change in grand 
strategy refers to a significant shift in American interests that is tangible in policy outcomes or 
alliances changes, while a second order change encompasses only a minor strategic adjustment 
(Dueck 2006: 12). This variation may encompass modifications to “military spending, alliance 
commitments, foreign aid, diplomatic activism, and/or foreign policy stands toward potential 
adversaries” (Dueck 2006: 13).  
The agenda setting phase of strategic adjustment, which occurs in the aftermath of a new 
threat or global crisis, allows for flexibility in grand strategy thinking (Dueck 2006: 38). 
Oftentimes, “interest groups, bureaucratic actors, or elected officials” present new ideas to 
foreign policymakers during this window of opportunity (Dueck 2006: 39). Typically, the 
president must determine which proposals should be pursued and generate political support for 
his chosen grand strategy after an assessment of American national interests and the current 
global environment (Dueck 2006: 40). Once the new grand strategy is institutionalized, “officials 
are unlikely to make adjustments until policy failure occurs” (Dueck 2006: 40).  
An example of US strategic adjustment is evident at the conclusion of the Cold War in 
November 1989 (Leffler and Legro 2011: 2). The bipolar international structure of the US and 
the Soviet Union as global superpowers, which had thrived since World War II, had officially 
come to an end, changing the “alignments and dynamics of major-power geopolitics” (Jentleson 
2004: 290). These changes led to a debate about US grand strategy and the American role in the 
global community, encouraging foreign policy officials to consider new interests and objectives 
as well as potential threats and strategic responses (Posen and Ross 1997: 3). Based on the 
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immense power that the US commanded after the Cold War victory, Daalder and Lindsay state, 
“the foreign policy questions Americans faced…had little to do with what the United States 
could do abroad…[but] what the United States should do abroad” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 8). 
In order to contextualize the Bush Doctrine in the grand strategy debate after the Cold 
War, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross assess the four primary grand strategies in “Competing 
Visions for US Grand Strategy”: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security 
and primacy (Posen and Ross 1997: 3). Although these grand strategy theories are not mutually 
exclusive, they “contain fundamental disagreements about strategic objectives and priorities” in 
US foreign policy (Posen and Ross 1997: 50).  
Neo-isolationism is an unpopular and unambitious grand strategy proposal that holds “a 
constricted view of US national interests that renders internationalism not only unnecessary but 
counterproductive” (Posen and Ross 1997: 7). This strategy is unequivocally dictated by realism, 
as it emphasizes national defense and security (Posen and Ross 1997). Neo-isolationism relies 
exclusively on US economic and military power to defend against potential aggressors and 
discourages American involvement abroad (Posen and Ross 1997: 10). The selective engagement 
grand strategy theory, also influenced by realist ideals, emphasizes the importance of peace 
among the great powers (Posen and Ross 1997: 15). This theory asserts that because great 
powers pose the gravest potential threat, selective engagement in the international community 
with a focus on peace will best ensure American security and prevent unnecessary costs (Posen 
and Ross 1997: 16).  
 Cooperative security is the only grand strategy influenced by liberalism rather than 
realism and proposes the most expansive view of American interests, asserting, “the United 
States has a huge national interest in world peace” (Posen and Ross 1997: 21-22). This strategy 
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underscores the importance of international institutions and alliances, which can address threats, 
maintain deterrence capabilities and coordinate collective action (Posen and Ross 1997). 
Although cooperative security emphasizes strategic interdependence, it asserts that the US 
should lead according to shared values with allies (Posen and Ross 1997: 28). Primacy, the 
fourth grand strategy alternative, is centered on American unipolarity due to the great power 
competition that threatens American security and global peace. Therefore, the US should seek 
political, economic and military dominance within the global community (Posen and Ross 1997: 
30). This grand strategy rejects a reliance on allies and promotes unilateralism, arguing that the 
US operates best alone (Posen and Ross 1997).  
Posen and Ross identify A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 
published by the Clinton Administration in February 1996, as a symbolic document that outlines 
the Clinton grand strategy (Posen and Ross 1997: 42). This policy document “contains within it 
the language of cooperative security and selective engagement, plus a dash of primacy” (Posen 
and Ross 1997: 42). This phrasing aptly describes the inherent tensions within the grand strategy, 
which had important implications for the foreign policies pursued throughout the 1990s. The 
Clinton Administration sought greater interconnectedness among nation states and the global 
spread of political, economic, cultural and technological institutions in addition to political 
frameworks that would “link security and economic interests” and “evolve to meet changing 
circumstances” (Leffler and Legro 2011: 26). These goals led to a multilateral approach in 
addressing new security challenges in the post-Cold War world, as the global community forged 
alliances, implemented treaties and established behavioral norms (Leffler and Legro 2011: 27). 
American leadership in such institutions allowed the US to share responsibility with the 
international community in addressing common challenges (Leffler and Legro 2011: 27). The 
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US promoted free trade and open markets to increase prosperity and emphasized global 
economic competition (Dueck 2006: 130).  
The initial hopefulness about the promise of multilateral institutions and global 
cooperation was tempered by harsh political realities faced in the 1990s, as conflict in Haiti, 
Rwanda and the Balkans compelled American intervention (Dueck 2006: 137). Although the US 
aimed to serve as a leader among allies, the Clinton Administration sought to limit costs incurred 
during grand strategy implementation and officials were reluctant to commit force to realize 
foreign policy goals (Dueck 2006: 137). The US had developed the military capacity to “launch 
airstrikes, cruise missiles precision guided weapons, arms sales, economic and covert military 
aid” and sought to overpower “any possible combination of hostile powers” while defending 
American interests within the new international order (Dueck 2006: 114). Ambitious attempts at 
engagement and enlargement were unmatched by resources, leading to “a serious and continuing 
gap between capabilities and commitments in the conduct of US grand strategy” and tension 
between internationalist ideals and national interests (Dueck 2006: 146).  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, foreign policy officials operated under the assumption 
that the US should serve as a global leader due to its unique liberal values (Dueck 2006: 114). 
The Clinton Administration emphasized that the US was an “indispensable nation” and presented 
America as a symbolic example of freedom and democracy, values that guided US involvement 
in global conflict (Dueck 2006: 131). The US additionally maintained unilateral military capacity, 
despite willingness to engage in the international community and support alliances, indicating an 
inclination toward primacy (Posen and Ross 1997).  
Despite debates regarding American grand strategy in the aftermath of the Cold War, US 
foreign policy was notably consistent throughout the 1990s (Dueck 2006: 115). Because the US 
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perceived its Cold War victory as an affirmation of the success of democratic ideals, there was 
little incentive for American officials to reevaluate Cold War foreign policies or undergo 
strategic adjustment in grand strategy (Dueck 2006: 115). This continuity was especially 
apparent in US foreign policy in the Middle East (Terry 2008). Although the US shifted its focus 
from containing communism to other foreign policy priorities in the region, the US continued to 
view the Middle East as a critical region for American interests (Terry 2008: 338). US foreign 
policies pursued in the Middle East directly after the Cold War are especially important in 
establishing the context to examine the Bush Doctrine, which was developed in response to the 
punitive threats emanating from this region after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
The Gulf War in 1990-1991 was the most significant and costly American commitment 
in the Middle East immediately after the Cold War (Terry 2008: 338). During the 1979 Iran 
Revolution, which threatened to spread the Shiite vision of Islam throughout the Middle East, the 
US and Gulf allies encouraged Iraq to challenge the new Iranian regime (Terry 2008: 338). The 
US shared armaments and intelligence information with Saddam Hussein and enhanced its 
military presence in the Middle East (Terry 2008: 338). The war cost Iraq approximately $561 
billion, much of which was borrowed from Kuwait and other Gulf nations (Terry 2008: 339). 
Although Saddam Hussein assumed that the war loans would be forgiven, Kuwait demanded 
reimbursement and Gulf War allies denied funding for reconstruction efforts, leading to the 
“economic strangulation of Iraq” (Terry 2008: 339).  
Driven by paranoia and economic paralysis, Saddam Hussein commanded Iraqi forces to 
invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Khlaifat and Bashayreh 2010: 334). The invasion led to the 
collapse of the Kuwaiti government and the evacuation of the royal family as Iraq occupied the 
country and proclaimed this territory the nineteenth Iraqi province (Terry 2008: 339). President 
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H.W. Bush outlined American demands of Saddam Hussein on September 11, 1990: “the 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate 
government, the assurance of stability and security within the Gulf, and the protection of US 
citizens abroad” (Khlaifat and Bashayreh 2010: 334). Although Arab states attempted diplomacy, 
the US launched air strikes against Iraq in January 1991, destroying Iraqi infrastructure (Terry 
2008: 340). On February 24, Allied forces initiated the ground war to reclaim Kuwait city and its 
airport, leading to a clear victory for the American-led operation and a crushing loss for Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq (Terry 2008: 340).  
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the US endured international criticism for its unclear 
war motives and Iraq continued to challenge American foreign policymakers (Wright 1998: 53). 
Although Americans assumed that toppling Saddam Hussein would “discredit radicalism, 
strengthen moderates and enhance regional stability” (Rodman 2004: 1), the conclusion of the 
war did not overthrow his regime and the dictator continued to incite political tension with Iraq’s 
neighbors, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Wright 1998: 53-54). Despite shared goal of 
regime change in Iraq, the US and its allies did not seek the United Nations’ approval to achieve 
this objective and the international community questioned the decision to withdraw while 
Saddam Hussein remained in power (Khlaifat and Bashayreh 2010: 335). 
The subsequent US policy of containment consisted of efforts to maintain a southern no-
fly zone, UN economic sanctions and arms embargo, UN weapons of mass destruction 
inspections and support for Iraqi opposition groups (Wright 1998: 57). This policy was largely 
unsuccessful, as Saddam Hussein repeatedly stalled UNSCOM inspections (Wright 1998: 57) 
and the sanctions prevented an Iraqi recovery (Terry 2008: 341). Saddam Hussein exploited 
international criticism of American policies to “isolate the United States and limit the open-
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ended disarmament process” as he continued to defy no-fly zones and block inspectors (Wright 
1998: 63). Yet “even as the US position grew tougher, other countries were taking steps to bring 
Saddam’s regime back into the international fold” (Wright 1998: 62). Many previous partners 
during the Gulf War resumed diplomatic and commercial relations with Iraq and urged the 
United Nations to ease sanctions to return Iraqi oil revenue to the global economy, dividing the 
US and its allies (Wright 1998: 63). American troop presence in the Gulf further irritated Arab 
countries and contributed to the international disapproval of US foreign policy in the region 
(Wright 1998: 58).  
 In addition to the Gulf War, the US confronted issues of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Jentleson 2004: 303). Although 
counterterrorism measures had been implemented since the 1970s, pre-9/11 policies were 
“limited in scope and duration” and primarily focused on ineffective economic sanctions with 
little military action (Jentleson 2004: 303). Many Islamic terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, 
Hamas and Hezbollah, “employ terrorist tactics against American interests to achieve their ends” 
and threaten regional stability and Israeli security (David 2006: 627). Though the goals of these 
distinct terrorist groups vary, they share a willingness to target civilians in order to convey their 
radical political message through violent means (David 2006: 627).  
Due to the difficulty in deterring extremist groups and the complicity of Middle Eastern 
governments in supporting terrorist movements, terrorism is an especially challenging threat to 
mediate (David 2006: 628). The US cannot easily deter terrorist attacks and many Arab leaders 
covertly support terrorist groups with political and monetary resources (David 2006: 628). Many 
scholars also attribute the rise of terrorist groups with the corruption and repression of Middle 
Eastern governments and their inability to provide public goods (David 2006: 628). The risk of 
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nuclear proliferation in the Middle East heightens the threat of terrorism, as terrorist groups 
could potentially employ weapons of mass destruction against the US if they acquired nuclear 
material (David 2006: 629).  
The US sought to encourage democracy in the Middle East in the 1990s, primarily to 
improve economic conditions, but did not significantly pressure Arab states to engage in 
democratic reform as part of its counterterrorism strategy prior to 2001 (David 2006: 628). The 
Clinton Administration “focused on international trade as the engine of growth and economic 
reform” and the Bush Administration continued this policy prior to 9/11 (Dunne 2005: 210). 
Even though the US gained credibility to promote democracy due to the ideological victory of 
the Cold War, political officials worried that aggressive democracy promotion efforts would 
jeopardize American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Dunne 2005: 211). 
Although there were many ideological differences between the US and Middle Eastern regimes, 
American officials avoided discussing domestic governance with autocratic rulers in order to 
preserve important regional alliances (Dunne 2005: 211). Politicians also believed that engaging 
directly with friendly, authoritarian rulers would be more beneficial to US interests than 
negotiating with future democratic governments that may not support American foreign policies 
in the region (Dunne 2005: 211). This prioritization of strategic interests over ideological 
concerns in US alliance management reflects the extent to which US foreign policy was 
entrenched in realism rather than liberalism prior to 9/11.  
Part II: The Bush Doctrine   
George W. Bush was elected president in this post-Cold War world and articulated his 
vision for US foreign policy during his campaign in 2000 (Owens 2009: 24). President Bush 
supported similar realist foreign policy strategies that his father had pursued from 1989-1993 
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(Owens 2009: 24). He believed that the US must actively engage in international affairs and that 
US foreign policies should promote American interests abroad (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 39). 
Although President Bush was not entirely opposed to American intervention, he criticized the 
Clinton Administration’s failure to prioritize and the indiscriminate deployment of military 
forces to various regional conflicts (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 37). Bush Administration 
officials were initially “assertive nationalists” and were averse to nation building, especially 
when this process involved sending American troops abroad (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 46). 
President Bush promised the American public “a clear set of priorities based on a hard-nosed 
assessment of America’s national interests” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 38). Dueck explains that 
President Bush initially hoped to limit international engagement and lessen the American 
influence in the multilateral institutions that President Clinton favored, indicating an emphasis on 
strategic rather than ideological interests (Dueck 2006: 147). 
But the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, constituted a national trauma for the US 
(History 2013). 19 militants “hijacked four airliners and carried out suicide attacks against 
targets in the United States” (History 2013). The hijackers crashed two planes into the north and 
south towers of the World Trade Center in New York City (History 2013). In addition to the 
3,000 people killed in New York, 343 firefighters and paramedics, 23 NYPD officers and 37 Port 
Authority officers also lost their lives (History 2013). When the third plane crashed into the west 
side of the Pentagon military headquarters, killing 125 military personnel and civilians, 
passengers on the fourth plane were able to intercept the final attack and crashed the plane into a 
rural Pennsylvania field (History 2013). The terrorists were financed by Al-Qaeda, a terrorist 
organization led by Osama bin Laden, and were “allegedly acting in retaliation for America’s 
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support of Israel, its involvement in the Persian Gulf War, and its continued military presence in 
the Middle East” (History 2013).  
The Bush Doctrine developed in the aftermath of these attacks, which shocked American 
citizens and foreign policymakers alike. This grand strategy was communicated to the American 
public through President Bush’s public statements and the 2002 National Security Strategy. 
Robert Jervis outlines the four main pillars of the Bush Doctrine: 
1. Democracy and Liberalism;  
2. Threat and Preventive War; 
3. Unilateralism; and  
4. American Hegemony (Jervis 2003).  
Foreign policy scholars largely agree that these four principles were essential to the Bush 
Doctrine. The debate emerges when discussing the extent to which these principles dictated US 
foreign policy and whether they represent a continuation with or a departure from foreign policy 
trends.  
Pillar One: Democracy and Liberalism  
 Jervis identifies “Democracy and Liberalism” as the first tenet of the Bush Doctrine, a 
policy component that has challenged scholars in their attempts to classify the Bush 
Administration’s grand strategy as realist, liberal or neoconservative (Jervis 2003: 366). The 
Bush Doctrine has an unmistakably ideological component (Jervis 2003: 366). The Bush 
Administration assumed that because domestic regimes play an essential role in formulating 
foreign policies, the spread of democratic and liberal values throughout the international 
community would encourage government reform, thereby enhancing global security with the 
expansion of liberal democracies (Jervis 2003: 366). The Bush Administration also believed that 
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by promoting values of “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,” the US would play a 
transformative role in “making the world not just safer, but better” (Jervis 2003: 366). 
Democracy promotion was intended to minimize terrorism, enhance international stability and 
cement alliances, thus advancing American interests (Jervis 2003: 366). However, this element 
of the Bush Doctrine was primarily emphasized after the US did not discover weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq and the Bush Administration was forced to shift its justification for war 
(Jervis 2003: 366). It was only in late 2003 that administration officials argued that a 
democratized Iraq would serve as a catalyst for a wave of democratization throughout the Middle 
East and inherently benefit the US (Jervis 2003: 366).  
 Although Jervis asserts that this element of the Bush Doctrine is liberal in nature due to 
its optimism regarding the potential for democracy to augment global peace and security, other 
scholars contest this assertion and the extent to which ideology influenced the Bush Doctrine 
(Jervis 2003: 367). In “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” Jonathen Monten elaborates on two 
contrasting strategies of democracy promotion: exemplarism and vindicationism (Monten 2005: 
113). While exemplarism asserts that global influence and prestige are derived from the 
American force of example, vindicationism relies on proactive policies to promote universal 
liberal values and institutions (Monten 2005: 113). Monten situates neoconservatism in the 
vindicationist strategy of exceptionalism and argues that the shift in the Bush Doctrine is 
apparent in “the particular vehemence with which it adheres to a vindicationist framework for 
democracy promotion” rather than the presence of ideological interests in US foreign policy 
(Monten 2005: 141). After the declaration of the War on Terror and War on Iraq, the Bush 
Administration increasingly attempted to shape domestic governance abroad and elevated 
vindicationism to a central role in US foreign policy, according to Monten (Monten 2005: 140).  
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 Although Daalder and Lindsay agree with Monten’s assertion that the Bush Doctrine 
represents a shift in US foreign policy, they reject the notion that this grand strategy was 
neoconservative (Daalder and Lindsay 2005). In America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in 
Foreign Policy, Daalder and Lindsay argue, “this conventional wisdom…fundamentally 
misunderstood the intellectual currents within the Bush Administration and the Republican Party 
more generally” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 14). According to Daalder and Lindsay, Bush and 
his advisers should be classified as “assertive nationalists” who sought to preserve American 
security rather than promote ideologies abroad (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 14). These scholars 
highlight the shift in the tone of President Bush’s public statements when it was evident that 
Saddam Hussein never possessed weapons of mass destruction in late 2003 (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2008: 14). They acknowledge that although his rhetoric evolved over time to rationalize 
the invasion after shocking miscalculations, President Bush’s early foreign policy decisions were 
implemented with realist intentions (Daalder and Lindsay 2008: 14).  
Daalder and Lindsay also discuss the ideological and religious rhetoric that permeated 
Bush’s foreign policy statements and believe that the War on Terror became a personal mission 
for President Bush (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 86). His investment extended beyond national 
security interests and reflected the fundamental “struggle between good and evil that touched all 
the world’s peoples” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 86). Daalder and Lindsay explain that his 
frequent religious invocations and explanations of the American mission “encouraged the 
speculation that he believed himself the instrument of Providence,” fueling critics who attacked 
the ideological components of the Bush Doctrine (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 87). Regardless of 
President Bush’s ideological rhetoric, Daalder and Lindsay conclude that the Bush Doctrine 
prioritized realist national security goals rather than liberal ideals (Daalder and Lindsay 2005). 
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The shift in US foreign policy was therefore not in the emphasis on American ideology, but 
rather in the means to promote these ideals (Daalder and Lindsay 2005).  
Yet many scholars disagree with the assertion that the Bush Doctrine represents a shift in 
US foreign policy. In his essay, “Political and Moral Myths in American Foreign Policy: The 
Neoconservative Question,” Chris Langille agrees that the Bush Doctrine is neoconservative, but 
argues that this grand strategy stems from a tradition that emphasizes “war as a moral crusade,” 
proclaims the US the “custodian of the international system ” and prioritizes ideological foreign 
policy goals (Langille 2008: 321). Langille traces the history of neoconservative ideals, 
beginning with the inception of neoconservatism during the Vietnam War, to demonstrate that 
these values have been consistently present in US foreign policies and to support his argument 
for continuity (Langille 2008: 323). The original neoconservatives emerged as fierce opponents 
of communism in the 1970s who believed that “liberal democracy was forever imperiled and 
under siege by successive ‘existential threats’” (Langille 2008: 324). This fear led 
neoconservatives to reject liberal internationalism and multilateralism in the global community 
and assert that the US should serve as a moral exemplar for democratic values (Langille 2008: 
324).  
According to Langille, the Bush Administration viewed the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a 
“vindication” of their fears and “a confirmation of the successive existential threats to America 
and the liberal order,” which justified aggressive democracy promotion efforts (Langille 2008: 
328). Langille concludes that a shift occurred in the existential threat that American foreign 
policymakers addressed with the defeat of communism and rise of terrorism (Langille 2008: 
329). The “recurring themes of US foreign policy,” such as moral principles, democracy and 
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threat perception, are crucial elements of the Bush Doctrine according to Langille and have 
endured throughout American history (Langille 2008: 321).  
Brian Schmidt and Michael Williams agree with Langille and Monten and classify the 
Bush Doctrine as a neoconservative grand strategy in their 2008 article, “The Bush Doctrine and 
the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists” (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 191). Schmidt 
and Williams assess the realist opposition to the War in Iraq to highlight the divergences 
between neoconservative and realist thought and to bolster their claim that the Bush Doctrine 
stems from recurring neoconservative ideals (Schmidt & Williams 2008: 201). Realism rejects 
the notion that the US should “engage in moralist foreign policy crusades to remake the world in 
its own image” and disavows the democratic peace theory (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 202-
203). Therefore, realist scholars fervently opposed the American-initiated regime change in Iraq 
(Schmidt and Williams 2008: 202-203). Because realism emphasizes balance-of-power politics, 
realist scholars assume that other states would never concede power to another state by adopting 
political values or beliefs; therefore Iraq could never truly serve as a democratic catalyst in the 
Middle East, as neoconservatives suggested (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 204). Realists argued, 
“a change in the character of the units (states) is unlikely to change the nature of international 
politics” and agreed that conventional tactics of deterrence would effectively contain Saddam 
Hussein (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 204). This perspective would render preventive warfare, a 
core principle of the Bush Doctrine, unnecessary (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 204). Schmidt 
and Williams conclude that although the realists failed to influence the Bush Doctrine, 
neoconservative inclinations have been present throughout American history and therefore this 
grand strategy does not represent a departure from foreign policy tradition.    
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In After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy, Lynch and Singh 
echo Daalder and Lindsay’s skepticism that the Bush Doctrine was based in neoconservative 
theory, yet argue that this grand strategy was rooted in US foreign policy tradition (Lynch and 
Singh 2008). Like Daalder and Lindsay, these scholars assert that leading policymakers in the 
Bush Administration should be classified as traditional realists or “national interest 
conservatives,” rather than neocons (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155). This argument is based on the 
premise that “regime change in Iraq was justified in the American national interest” and was 
guided by strategic, rather than ideological motivations, consistent with the realist tradition in US 
foreign policy (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155). The War in Iraq was declared to address threats to 
American security, rather than regime change (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155).  
Lynch and Singh acknowledge that neoconservative elements were present in the Bush 
Doctrine, but they claim that this inclination towards neoconservatism was evident when 
weapons of mass destruction were not found and was not the primary justification for the 
invasion (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155). The Bush Administration applied the democratic peace 
theory to its foreign policy in hindsight as a strategy to minimize regional threats by spreading 
American values abroad (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155). Thus Lynch and Singh argue that 
motivations for regime change were strategic, rather than ideological, and the Bush Doctrine 
should be considered realist rather than neoconservative (Lynch and Singh 2008: 155).  
Yet Lynch and Singh disagree with Daalder and Lindsay’s discussion of the “Bush 
revolution” and argue that the War on Terror should be “understood as a revision rather than a 
rejection of the dominant American foreign policy tradition” by highlighting the continuities in 
foreign policy (Lynch and Singh 2008: 17). Lynch and Singh discuss the “fierce ideological wars 
that have preserved, enhanced and spread fundamental freedoms” in American history (Lynch 
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and Singh 2008: 45). The US fought for independence from Great Britain in the War of 
Independence and abolished the injustice of slavery during the Civil War (Lynch and Singh 
2008: 45). Americans defeated Nazism in the Second Cold War and diminished the influence of 
communism during the Cold War (Lynch and Singh 2008: 45). Lynch and Singh also emphasize 
that American presidents have often led wars to defeat “ideological opponents” and have been 
successful largely due to the success of “moral” foreign policy campaigns in US foreign policy 
(Lynch and Singh 2008: 45). This discussion echoes Langille’s emphasis on the change in the 
existential threat from communism to terrorism rather than a shift in the foreign policy strategies 
implemented to confront these threats (Lynch and Singh 2008: 45).  
In “The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire,” Thomas Owens 
provides additional evidence to reject the dominant narrative of the Bush Doctrine as a 
neoconservative policy and argue for continuity in US foreign policy (Owens 2009: 25). He 
states, “the Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that US national interest has 
always been concerned with more than simple security - it has always had both a commercial and 
an ideological component” (Owens 2009: 25). Owens claims that US foreign policy cannot be 
classified as strictly realist or liberal; while realism emphasizes national security to the detriment 
of economic and ideological goals and liberalism prioritizes global “peace and prosperity” over 
“power and security,” “American principles have been at least as important in shaping US 
foreign policy as the raw pursuit of power beloved by realists” (Owens 2009: 30). American 
foreign policy consists of a commitment to protecting and promoting the moral principles 
outlined in the United States’ founding documents as well as aspirations of economic prosperity 
and global power (Owens 2009: 39). Because American interests have always included 
economic issues and moral principles, Owens asserts that democracy promotion cannot be 
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separated from national interests and therefore the Bush Doctrine does not signify a departure 
from US foreign policy (Owens 2009: 30).  
  Although scholars differ in their arguments regarding the extent to which ideology 
influenced the Bush Doctrine and their classification of this grand strategy as realist, liberal or 
neoconservative, they agree that the ideological tenets have been consistent throughout American 
foreign policy tradition. American exceptionalism and democracy promotion is not a new, but 
rather a continuous trend in US foreign policy, and thus the debate centers on whether the 
strategies utilized by the Bush Administration to spread these values constitute change or 
continuity in US foreign policy tradition. Pillar two of the Bush Doctrine addresses the 
preventive war strategy that the Bush Administration employed to achieve its foreign policy 
goals.  
Pillar Two: Threat and Preventive War 
Threat and preventive war, the second pillar of the Bush Doctrine, encompasses the 
“heightened sense of vulnerability” (Jervis 2003: 369) as well as the high “security risks and 
costs of inaction” that American citizens and officials perceived after 9/11 (Jervis 2003: 371). 
This change in threat perception and fear of another attack on American soil led the Bush 
Administration to emphasize the urgency of new global challenges (Jervis 2003: 369). In several 
public addresses, President Bush insisted that the conventional deterrence measures that 
succeeded during the Cold War would be ineffective in protecting American citizens from 
terrorism (Jervis 2003: 369). He concluded that without deterrence as a viable option, the US 
must either utilize prevention, with potentially faulty intelligence data, or defense, which is 
impossible given the sheer size of American territory (David 2006: 628). During his 
Commencement Address to the West Point Military Academy on June 1, 2002, President Bush 
	  	  
23 
explicitly articulated the potential for preventive warfare in order to address threats that cannot 
be contained by deterrence (McCartney 2005: 415). This controversial element of the Bush 
Doctrine “laid the groundwork for Bush’s Iraq policy” (McCartney 2005: 414) and was criticized 
by American citizens and the global community (Jervis 2003: 369).   
Daalder and Lindsay discuss the “conceptual confusion” of the rhetoric employed by 
President Bush during his Commencement Address to explain this new security strategy to the 
American public (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 125). They claim that President Bush “conflated 
the notion of preemptive and preventive war,” which created misperceptions and resulted in the 
incorrect identification of military strategy by the media and foreign policy scholars (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2005: 125). Although President Bush specifically referred to preemptive action in 
his public speeches, his description of military strategy indicated his intention to employ 
preventive, rather preemptive, warfare (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 125). This distinction is 
crucial in understanding the Bush Doctrine and the resulting condemnation from the international 
community, as preemptive wars “have a long-recognized standing in international law as a 
legitimate form of self-defense, [while] preventive wars did not” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 
125). Owens further clarifies this point and states, “while international law and norms have 
always acknowledged the right of a state to launch a preemptive strike against another when an 
attack by the latter is imminent, it has rejected any right of preventive war” (Owens 2009: 26).  
Although the goals of promoting liberal ideals and ensuring American security were 
consistent with US foreign policy tradition, Daalder and Lindsay argue that rejecting Cold War 
deterrence tactics was unprecedented (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 124). Many foreign policy 
experts questioned why President Bush made such an explicit statement advocating for 
preventive warfare during the West Point Commencement Address and worried that other 
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countries would also adopt this military tactic in order to justify other interventions (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005: 125). When it became clear that Iraq was the primary objective behind this 
military strategy, policymakers also feared that preventively attacking Saddam Hussein might 
provoke him to use the weapons of mass destructions he was presumed to possess (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005: 126). Scholars believed that President Bush emphasized the potential for this new 
military strategy soon after 9/11 in order to prepare the American public for the likelihood of a 
second war (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 125). 
Leffler disagrees with Daalder and Lindsay in “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” 
claiming that the preventive war pillar of the Bush Doctrine was neither revolutionary nor 
transformative (Leffler 2005: 397). He discusses the historical instances when preemptive 
military action was utilized and preventive warfare was considered (Leffler 2005: 397). Leffler 
cites Theodore Roosevelt’s preemptive intervention justification for US involvement in the 
Caribbean and Central America as well as Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration, “This is the time for 
prevention of attack” when the US Greer was attacked by Nazi submarines (Leffler 2005: 398). 
Leffler also states that although the Kennedy Administration decided not to utilize preventive 
warfare in response to the Soviet Union’s rapid military buildup, both preemptive and preventive 
strategies were deliberated (Leffler 2005: 400). The Kennedy Administration additionally 
evaluated potential benefits of utilizing preventive military action against China as its nuclear 
stockpiles increased (Leffler 2005: 400). Leffler concludes that the Bush Administration’s 
preventive war strategy can be traced in American foreign policy history and does not represent a 
significant shift (Leffler 2005: 404).  
Lynch and Singh agree that preventive warfare was not revolutionary and that security 
interests have historically influenced American foreign policy decisions (Lynch and Singh 2008: 
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28). These scholars discuss the recurrence of external threats in American history and argue that 
threat perception has continuously influenced the development of US foreign policy in response 
to new challenges to American security (Lynch and Singh 2008: 29). They acknowledge that 
although the preventive War in Iraq was “illegal under international law and the UN charter,” the 
war was legitimate “on the grounds of national and collective security” (Lynch and Singh 2008: 
167). Because President Bush was clear about his intentions to preventively address potential 
threats and the UN concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ justifies war waged for security 
interests, these scholars assert, “it was more international law that was the problem than the 
appropriateness of the war” (Lynch and Singh 2008: 165). Lynch and Singh additionally 
highlight the challenges that policymakers face when attempting to correctly detect threats and 
develop appropriate strategies to respond to them in “effective anticipatory defense” to justify 
the Bush Doctrine’s reliance on preventive war (Lynch and Singh 2008: 166).  
Preventive war is the most defining, and most controversial, pillar of the Bush Doctrine. 
This element of the Bush Administration’s grand strategy provides the most compelling evidence 
for the argument that the Bush Doctrine represented an aberration from foreign policy trends due 
to the aggressive means utilized to preserve American security. Yet many scholars still dismiss 
claims of a revolutionary foreign policy strategy by citing historical examples of preemptive 
military tactics to demonstrate continuity in US foreign policy.  
Pillar Three: Unilateralism   
 Jervis demonstrates a connection between pillar two and pillar three, unilateralism, and 
argues that preventive war is typically declared unilaterally because it is difficult to garner 
international support for such an aggressive military strategy (Jervis 2003: 374). Although the 
US accepted some assistance from the global community for military engagements in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq, the US emphasized building coalitions, rather than alliances, explicitly 
rejecting multilateralism (Jervis 2003: 374). Jervis explains that Bush Administration leaders 
“made it clear that they would forego the participation of any particular country rather than 
compromise” US foreign policy goals (Jervis 2003: 374).  
Daalder and Lindsay echo these claims and state that although there was significant 
inclination among the international community to support American military actions in 
Afghanistan, Washington largely ignored alliance assistance with the exceptions of Great Britain 
and Australia (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 115). President Bush’s “decided preference for 
unilateral action” was deemed easier and more efficient than multilateral efforts in the global 
community (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 13). He believed that the world was dangerous and 
presented threats to American security that could not be thwarted with international cooperation, 
but must be prevented by employing American military power (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 13). 
Although many American allies fervently opposed the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration ignored international objections and declared war on 
Iraq in March 2003, demonstrating that American goals took precedence over global consensus 
(Jervis 2003: 375). Though multilateralists condemned the unilateral move, Jervis asserts that 
these decisions ultimately strengthened the Bush Doctrine, as President Bush established that 
global criticism would not hinder American security objectives (Jervis 2003: 375).  
Although multilateralism would have appeased the international community, it would not 
ensure an American military victory, and President Bush’s priority in declaring war on Iraq was 
to enhance US security rather than strengthen alliances (Lynch and Singh 2008: 39). Those who 
opposed the War in Iraq believed that without an “explicit UN resolution,” Saddam’s removal 
was illegal, despite his consistent violation of UN resolutions (Lynch and Singh 2008: 39). But 
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Lynch and Singh highlight that President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld sought to build 
a coalition of nations; when support was not received from American alliances who disagreed 
with military action or feared terrorist retaliation, the Bush Administration continued with war 
plans to enhance American security (Lynch and Singh 2008: 39). Though President Bush sought 
support for the War in Iraq, he “had no intention of letting others dictate what the United States 
could do” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 13).   
Scholars generally agree that American unilateralism represents continuity rather than 
change in US foreign policy. Jervis notes that unilateralist action was apparent in the Bush 
Administration’s foreign policy decisions prior to 9/11, as the US rejected several international 
agreements and institutions in early 2001, including the Kyoto Protocol, the International 
Criminal Court and the ban on biological weapons (Jervis 2003: 374). Although Daalder and 
Lindsay argue that much of the Bush Doctrine is revolutionary, they believe that unilateral action 
is consistent with US foreign policy trends (Daalder and Lindsay 2005). Lynch and Singh also 
argue that the Bush Administration’s reliance on unilateralism is consistent with US foreign 
policy tradition (Lynch and Singh 2008). The US has employed multilateralism in foreign policy 
when it is convenient and efficient, but American policymakers have continuously demonstrated 
their willingness to abandon alliances when necessary to achieve US foreign policy goals (Lynch 
and Singh 2008: 43). President Bush “demanded a right to act in isolation, if necessary, to realize 
US security by securing the universal rights of foreigners” during the War in Iraq (Lynch and 
Singh 2008: 27).  
Isolationism, or “the concept that America’s security is proportional to the absence of its 
formal ties with foreign nations” is an enduring trend in US foreign policy (Lynch and Singh 
2008: 21). Lynch and Singh attribute American isolationism to the unique geography that the US 
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enjoys (Lynch and Singh 2008: 21). Because the US was geographically removed from Old 
World wars and modern-day regional tensions, American security has consistently been “only 
tangentially linked” to the outcome of global conflicts (Lynch and Singh 2008: 21).  
Unilateralism is consistent with the American tradition of pragmatic foreign policy and 
dates back to President Washington’s Farewell Address, which advised the new nation to avoid 
foreign entanglements in order to protect American security interests (Lynch and Singh 2008: 
36). Lynch and Singh also cite Woodrow Wilson, champion of multilateral cooperation and the 
League of Nations, and his acknowledgement of the “limitations of filial obligations in 
international politics” (Lynch and Singh 2008: 36). The US utilized multilateral alliances during 
World War II and the Cold War, but forged questionable partnerships with regimes of starkly 
contrasting ideologies, as “American foreign policymakers have tended to value foreign alliances 
for their utility rather than their ideological purity” (Lynch and Singh 2008: 36). This willingness 
to ally with illiberal regimes demonstrates the American prioritization of strategic, rather than 
ideological, interests in foreign policy, indicating a tendency towards realism in grand strategy.  
 Leffler boldly claims, “unilateralism is quintessentially American” (Leffler 2005: 405). 
He asserts that neither ambitions for military dominance nor a reliance on unilateral action are 
unfounded in US foreign policy tradition and that the accumulation of threats in the aftermath of 
9/11 led policymakers to acknowledge the American need to act alone (Leffler 2005: 405). 
Although the US formed many strategic alliances in order to augment the American position 
during the Cold War, officials “never foreclosed the right to act unilaterally and often did so” 
(Leffler 2005: 405). The US also ignored French and British caution during the Vietnam War 
and received little international support for containing the spread of communism (Leffler 2005: 
401). Although the US typically accepts assistance from alliances, the US has never hesitated to 
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employ unilateral action in the international community when it was beneficial to do so, 
indicating that the Bush Doctrine reliance on unilateralism is anything but revolutionary (Leffler 
2005).  
 Scholars resoundingly agree that unilateralism was an essential element of the Bush 
Doctrine and that this tradition is deeply engrained in the history of US foreign policy. This 
concept guided the US decision to declare war on Iraq without support from the United Nations 
Security Council or Cold War alliances. Many critics point to American unilateralism as the 
central mistake of the Bush Administration and believe that the US should not have invaded Iraq 
without support from the United Nations. In reality, this tendency toward unilateral action is a 
more consistent trend in US foreign policy than multilateralism.  
Pillar Four: American Hegemony  
Jervis concludes his discussion with an analysis of American hegemony, the fourth pillar 
of the Bush Doctrine, which unites the prior three pillars of the Bush Administration’s grand 
strategy (Jervis 2003: 376). Overall, the Bush Doctrine sought to assert American hegemony, or 
primacy, in the international community through ideological and strategic means (Jervis 2003: 
376). Jervis explains that this grand strategy rejected the universal norms and institutions 
applicable to the global community (Jervis 2003: 376). The US assumes that it must operate 
differently than other states in order to ensure global order, stability and the preservation of 
liberal values (Jervis 2003: 376). Jervis alludes to President Bush’s West Point Commencement 
Speech, which emphasized the necessity for US military strength and high defense spending 
(Jervis 2003: 376). He classifies this military logic as “an implicit endorsement of the hegemonic 
stability theory,” as overwhelming American military power would prevent potential threats 
from other countries and ensure that other nation states did not need to enhance their own 
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militaries, ensuring American hegemony (Jervis 2003: 376). The Bush Administration believed 
that “the world cannot afford to return to traditional multipolar balance of power politics,” which 
would inevitably become dangerous, an assumption that validated the US role as the hegemonic 
power in the international community (Jervis 2003: 376-377).  
 Jervis argues that the American hegemony pillar of the Bush Doctrine was “consistent 
with standard patterns of international politics” and a natural, expected development after the 
Cold War (Jervis 2003: 377). This hegemony continued until 9/11, which furthered President 
Bush’s unilateral perspective (Jervis 2003: 379). Because the US was unchallenged by another 
powerful nation state with competing ideology, as it was during the Cold War, American goals 
of promoting liberal values abroad became more realistic (Jervis 2003: 381). Jervis argues that 
“the combination of power, fear, and perceived opportunity” provided the US with an incentive 
to “reshape world politics” and universally apply American ideals abroad (Jervis 2003: 383). He 
additionally alludes to the security dilemma, which explains that the US is compelled to protect 
its national security by engaging in conflict with other states that potentially challenge or 
threaten American interests (Jervis 2003: 383).  
Daalder and Lindsay expand upon the hegemonist argument, which assumes that 
projecting American power within the global community will secure US interests domestically 
and internationally (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 40). Daalder and Lindsay also assess the 
importance of American power, leadership and the assumption that “given the same chance, 
people everywhere would make the same choice Americans had made since gaining 
independence more than two hundred years ago: they would embrace freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 124). This notion justified American primacy in the 
international community, as Bush Administration officials and American citizens assumed that 
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US ideals were both universally applicable and universally sought. Yet this assumption was also 
apparent immediately after the Cold War and was not unique to the Bush Doctrine.  
 Owens additionally classifies the American hegemony pillar of the Bush Doctrine as “a 
species of primacy, based on the intersection of hegemonic stability theory and the theory of the 
democratic peace” (Owens 2009: 26). He concedes that the Bush Doctrine is a form of 
“benevolent” primacy that preserves liberal values but assumes that only American strength can 
ensure global peace, allowing the US to ignore institutional restraints and international criticism 
in its foreign policy (Owens 2009: 27). Scholars agree that American hegemony, along with 
unilateralism, is central to the Bush Doctrine and that these principles represent continuity in US 



















Hypothesis 1: Ideology influenced the development of the Bush Doctrine and the data should 
demonstrate an increase in ideological rhetoric over time. The speeches delivered in the 
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks will be primarily strategic in nature as the Bush 
Administration immediately responded to the terrorist attacks. Ideological rhetoric will increase 
after President Bush’s June 1, 2002 Commencement Address at West Point, when he began to 
discuss the possibility of war in Iraq, and the Bush Doctrine will become increasingly 
neoconservative.  
Hypothesis 2: President Bush’s rhetorical emphasis on ideology will resonate with the American 
public and public opinion polls will demonstrate high domestic approval ratings regarding US 
foreign policy decisions.  
Hypothesis 3: The distribution of strategic and ideological word indicators will be fairly 
consistent throughout the National Security Strategies of the three presidential administrations, 
as these documents tend to be very similar rhetorically, regardless of differences in foreign 
policy objectives. The documents will have a larger percentage of strategic rather than 
ideological rhetoric due to the focus on national security. Despite similarities in the National 
Security Strategies, the Bush Doctrine will represent a shift in foreign policy due to its emphasis 











In order to address the three primary debates that are outlined in the hypotheses, a 
quantitative methodology must be utilized to determine the prevalence of strategic and 
ideological objectives in President Bush’s foreign policy statements and classify the Bush 
Doctrine as realist, liberal or neoconservative. This research quantifies the distribution of 
strategic and ideological word indicators in President Bush’s foreign policy statements and 
investigates the rhetorical strategies that President Bush utilized to communicate foreign policy 
goals. Rhetorical data collected from National Security Strategies published by the Clinton, Bush 
and Obama Administrations will contribute to the discussion regarding whether the Bush 
Doctrine collectively represents change or continuity in US foreign policy.  
President Bush’s public statements are central to this analysis due to the importance of 
presidential rhetoric in framing foreign policy decisions to the American public. McCartney 
emphasizes the significance of presidential rhetoric in contextualizing events such as 9/11 in 
“American Nationalism and US Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War” (McCartney 
2004). He asserts that this role falls directly to the president, because “as the figurehead of the 
nation, the president is understood both to embody and express its values, character and purpose” 
(McCartney 2005: 407). President Bush assumed this role and utilized his public statements in 
order to explain the implications of the attacks, assert a foreign policy agenda and generate 
support for the Bush Doctrine; therefore his statements are most pertinent in evaluating the 
content and objectives of the Bush Administration’s grand strategy.   
This research collected rhetorical data using basic content analysis techniques on a 
selection of President Bush’s foreign policy speeches from September 11, 2001, to March 19, 
2003, to classify these statements as primarily strategic or ideological in nature. This time period 
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is crucial because it represents the foreign policy era from immediately after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks until the US declaration of war on Iraq. In the selection of 59 speeches (15 from 2001, 31 
from 2002, and 13 from 2003) President Bush discusses the American foreign policy response to 
9/11, the association of the 9/11 with Saddam Hussein and the assumed weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq. The speeches delivered during this time frame are especially important in 
understanding the Bush Doctrine, as the rhetoric was utilized to justify two wars in the Middle 
East and explain the Administration’s broader foreign policy goals in the region.  
After reading these speeches with careful attention to word choice and recurring phrases, 
15 strategic word indicators and 15 ideological word indicators were selected as coding words 
for content analysis. These words were identified based on their repetition throughout the 
speeches and their foreign policy implications, specifically related to strategic or ideological 
interests and the four pillars of the Bush Doctrine. 
Table 1. Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators 





















After word indicators were selected, the speeches were opened with the Mac application 
“WordDump,” which complied a word count for each speech. Strategic and ideological word 
indicators were counted and recorded in an Excel spreadsheet for each of the speeches selected. 
Plurals and slight variations of the words (e.g. freedoms, liberation, etc.) were also included in 
these word counts. The sums of the strategic word indicators and the ideological word indicators 
were calculated to classify each speech as primarily strategic or ideological in content. The ratios 
between ideological word indicators and total word indicators were also calculated in each 
speech to assess underlying rhetorical trends.  
This analysis was also applied to National Security Strategies published by three different 
presidential Administrations: The Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy published 
in February 1995, the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy published in September 
2002 and the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy published in May 2010. This 
data will determine rhetorical trends across presidential administrations and assess the balance of 
strategic or ideological interests within these documents, yielding insight into the foreign policy 
context of the Bush Doctrine and the trends of change and continuity among grand strategies.  
Limitations of Data  
 Although this data contributes to the discussion regarding the foreign policy context of 
the Bush Doctrine and trends of change and continuity in US grand strategy, there are 
undoubtedly limitations to this evidence. The content analysis employed relies solely on word 
count and does not take overall tone or context into consideration. Despite attempts to ensure that 
the data was calculated accurately, these figures are subject to human error. Although these 
speeches were selected carefully for their primary emphasis on foreign policy, the collection of 
foreign policy statements is merely a sample of many presidential speeches. Additional speeches 
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may have enhanced the data pool and revealed a more nuanced interpretation of strategic and 
ideological trends. The limited time frame (September 11, 2001, to March 19, 2003) also 
constricts the sample size of the speeches collected. Many scholars believe that President Bush 
began to emphasize ideological interests in 2004, when it became clear that Iraq was not 
concealing weapons of mass destruction. Future studies may apply the same methodology to 
include additional speeches beyond this limited time frame to yield more conclusive data and a 
more comprehensive view of the evolution of the Bush Doctrine and President Bush’s foreign 




























DATA AND RESULTS 
 
Figures 1 and 2 display overall trends in strategic and ideological word indicators in the 
collection of foreign policy speeches delivered September 11, 2001, to March 19, 2003. The 
following figures in the data section present a smaller breakdown of the word indicators within 
each speech as well as the ratios of ideological to total word indicators to detect more subtle 
ideological trends. This data is presented in two time frames: September 11, 2001, to April 28, 
2002, and June 1, 2002, to March 19, 2003. The first time frame consists of speeches delivered in 
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which primarily focused on national security, 
counterterrorism efforts and the War in Afghanistan. This second time frame represents a shift in 
the focus of US foreign policy from the post-9/11 era to the pre-Iraq War era, which emphasized 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. These time 
frames were divided based on President Bush’s landmark Commencement Address on June 1, 
2002, which was the first instance in which the Bush Administration began to prepare the 
American public for the possibility of war with Iraq.  
Although Hypothesis 1 predicted that ideological rhetoric would increase over time, 
specifically after the June 1, 2002, West Point Commencement Address, President Bush’s 
foreign policy statements from September 11, 2001, to March 19, 2003, were overwhelmingly 
strategic in content. Figure 1 demonstrates that strategic word indicators significantly 
outnumbered ideological word indicators throughout the time period. Although President Bush 
consistently referred to American values throughout his public statements, strategic word 
indicators appeared more frequently. The peaks in the line graph in Figure 1 indicate lengthy 
speeches with more total words and thus more strategic and ideological word indicators, while 
the space between the blue and red lines displays the difference between strategic and ideological 
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word indicators utilized in a particular speech. Figure 2 additionally demonstrates that the 1206 
ideological word indicators used throughout the time period constitute approximately 23% of the 
total word indicators, while the 4042 strategic word indicators used constitute approximately 
77% of the total word indicators.  
Figure 1. Trends in Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators from September 11, 2001, to 




Figure 2. Total Frequencies and Percentages of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators 





In the selection of the 59 selected speeches, only three were classified as primarily 
ideological after employing the data techniques outlined in the methodology section above. 
These speeches included President Bush’s remarks at a September 11 remembrance ceremony on 
December 11, 2001, his address to the nation on the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2002, and remarks on humanitarian aid to Afghanistan on October 11, 2002. 
Although most speeches were primarily strategic in nature, ratios of ideological word indicators 
to the total word indicators reveals that ideology was especially prominent in certain speeches. If 
more than 30% of total word indicators in a given speech were ideological, the speech was 
assessed to determine ideological sub-trends within President Bush’s foreign policy statements. 
Figure 3 and Table 2 display rhetorical data from September 11, 2001, to April 28, 2002: 
Figure 3 displays the difference between strategic and ideological word indicators utilized in 
each speech and Table 2 displays the ratios of ideological word indicators to total word 
indicators in the speeches delivered during this first time period. Figure 4 and Table 3 display 
rhetorical data from June 1, 2002, to March 19, 2003: Figure 4 shows the difference between 
strategic and ideological word indicators utilized in each speech and Table 3 shows the ratios of 
ideological word indicators to total word indicators in the speeches delivered during the second 
time period. Collectively, these figures and tables provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
strategic and ideological trends within President Bush’s foreign policy statements in two distinct 








Figure 3. Frequencies of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators from September 11, 























Table 2. Ratio of Ideological Word Indicators to Total Words Used in Speeches Delivered 
from September 11, 2001, to April 28, 2002.  
 
Date of Speech Ideological Word Indicators Total Words Ratio  
09.11.01 4 21 0.190 
09.14.01 3 8 0.375 
09.17.01 6 14 0.429 
09.20.01 32 127 0.252 
09.24.01 10 91 0.110 
09.25.01 13 41 0.317 
09.26.01 5 27 0.185 
09.26.01 II 15 43 0.349 
09.27.01 15 60 0.250 
10.04.01 9 59 0.153 
10.10.01 12 43 0.280 
10.11.01 25 185 0.135 
11.08.01 30 100 0.300 
11.10.01 30 113 0.265 
12.11.01 7 10 0.700 
01.28.02 9 61 0.148 
01.29.02 46 171 0.270 
02.16.02 35 112 0.314 
03.07.02 32 86 0.372 
03.11.02 15 106 0.142 
03.20.02 5 83 0.060 
04.04.02 7 77 0.091 
04.17.02 27 133 0.203 
04.28.02 0 30 0.000 
 
Although the speeches delivered from September 11, 2001, to April 28, 2002, were 
primarily strategic, ideologocial rhetoric was consistently employed in order to unite the country 
in the aftermath of 9/11. President Bush immediately declared a global war against terrorism 
during his “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks” on September 11, 2001, and 
proclaimed, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them” (Bush [2001] 2013). This was the beginning of the “with us or against 
us” rhetoric that President Bush utilized throughout his speeches to identify enemies and gain 
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support for the War on Terror (Bush [2001] 2013). He additionally emphasized that the US was 
attacked by terrorists due to the ideals and opportunities enjoyed by American citizens, 
disregarding Al-Qaeda claims that 9/11 was orchestrated in response to American foreign 
policies in the Middle East (Bush [2001] 2013). This allowed President Bush to frame the War 
on Terror as a mission to preserve and defend American values and avoid taking responsibility 
for possible foreign policy mistakes (Bush [2001] 2013).  
 The data in Table 2 shows that 37.5% of total word indicators were ideological during 
President Bush’s speech on September 14, 2001, “Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance Service” (Bush [2001] 2013). Because this speech commemorated the victims and 
invoked religious references, it contained a greater amount of ideological rhetoric. President 
Bush continued to frame the terrorist attacks as a direct affront to American ideals, and stated 
that these enemies “have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender” (Bush 
[2001] 2013). 42.9% of total word indicators were ideological during his speech on September 
17, 2001, “Remarks at the Islamic Center of Washington,” as President Bush prasied the 
peaceful tenets of Islam and condemned terrorists who manipulate Islamic values to incite 
violence (Bush [2001] 2013). This speech emphasized religious tolerance in the US, an 
inherently ideological topic, which explains the recurrence of ideological word indicators (Bush 
[2001] 2013). Though he clarified that the US sought to fight terrorists rather than Muslims, he 
alluded to the superiority of American values and freedoms and distinguished between “good” 
and “evil” (Bush [2001] 2013).  
During an “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the US Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11” on September 20, 2001, President Bush demanded that the 
Taliban deliver Al-Qaeda leaders residing in Afghanistan (Bush [2001] 2013). This speech had 
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important implications for the declaration of war on Afghanistan after the Taliban did not 
acquiesce to American requests and refused to cooperate with US counterterrorism efforts (Bush 
[2001] 2013). When he spoke to the FBI on September 25, 2001, President Bush stated that the 
terrorists: 
“… strengthened the spirit of America. They have united the country. They have awoken 
a mighty nation that undertands that freedom is under assult, a mighty nation that will not 
rest until those who think they can take freedom away from any citizen in the world are 
brought to justice” (Bush [2001] 2013).  
31.7% of the word indicators during this speech were ideological (Table 2) due to President 
Bush’s emphasis on responding to an attack on American ideals (Bush [2001] 2013). 
 President Bush’s speech on September 26, 2001, “Remarks to Central Intelligence 
Agency Employees in Langley, Virginia” also discussed religious freedom in the US, as 34.9% 
of the word indicators were ideological (Table 2). President Bush’s “Remarks at a September 11 
Remembrance Ceremony,” delivered on December 11, 2001, was the only primarily ideological 
speech delivered during this time period, as 70% of total word indicators were ideological (Table 
2). He focused on paying tribute to 9/11 victims rather than on war and terrorism during this 
address. The persistence of ideological rhetoric during this time period demonstrates President 
Bush’s consistent references to American ideals in order to unite the nation after 9/11.   
 In President Bush’s “State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, he described the 
US as “liberating” Afghanistan as he praised the interim president, Chairman Hamid Karzai, and 
declared that the US and Afghanistan had become “allies against terror” (Bush [2002] 2013). 
President Bush also asserted that the nations of North Korea, Iran and Iraq constituted an “axis of 
evil” due to their alliances with terrorists and their potential to “threaten the peace of the world” 
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(Bush [2002] 2013). This antagonistic statement extended the War on Terror beyond American 
retaliation for the 9/11 attacks to a more comprehensive strategy to address all potential threats to 
American security. President Bush additionally addressed the enormous increase in defense 
spending and declared, “while the price of freedom of security is high, it is never too high” 
(Bush [2002] 2013). He explained the implementation of enhanced security measures and 
economic reform measures, all while celebrating American values and the American leadership 
role in the global community (Bush [2002] 2013).  
 In his “Remarks to the Troops at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska” on 
February 16, 2002, President Bush continued to describe 9/11 as a direct attack on American 
values: “And I look forward to sharing... my passionate belief in the values that we hold dear 
here in America: Freedom, freedom to worship, freedom to speak, freedom to achieve your 
dreams. And it’s those very values that came under attack on September the 11th” (Bush [2002] 
2013). Table 2 demonstrates that 31.3% of word indicators used during this speech were 
ideological due to President Bush’s patriotic rhetoric. Many other speeches discussed defending 
American security and freedom as well as promoting peace in the region, specifically referring to 
escalation of regional violence in Israel/Palestine in early 2002.  
 Overall, the speeches from September 11, 2001, to April 28, 2002, were strategic in 
rhetoric and content. President Bush commemorates the victims and emphasizes American ideals 
to enhance unity domestically and internationally, but his primary foreign policy objectives were 
centered on bringing the terrorists to justice and ensuring American security, which is reflected 





Figure 4. Frequencies of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators from June 1, 2002, to 


























Table 3. Ratio of Ideological Word Indicators to Total Words Used in Speeches Delivered 
from June 1, 2002, to March 19, 2003.  
 
Date of Speech Ideological Word Indicators Total Words Ratio  
06.01.02 46 142 0.323943662 
06.24.02 19 101 0.188118812 
07.04.02 15 36 0.416666667 
07.10.02 18 78 0.230769231 
07.16.02 3 25 0.12 
07.18.02 4 33 0.121212121 
07.22.02 16 71 0.225352113 
08.01.02 8 55 0.145454545 
08.07.02 24 106 0.226415094 
08.14.02 32 108 0.296296296 
09.11.02 19 32 0.59375 
09.12.02 58 156 0.371794872 
10.03.02 14 85 0.164705882 
10.07.02 48 192 0.25 
10.10.02 18 50 0.36 
10.11.02 46 83 0.554216867 
10.16.02 27 77 0.350649351 
10.16.02 II 2 46 0.043478261 
10.23.02 6 59 0.101694915 
11.08.02 19 73 0.260273973 
11.20.02 22 82 0.268292683 
11.25.02 10 87 0.114942529 
01.03.03 22 102 0.215686275 
01.28.03 38 183 0.207650273 
02.06.03 14 61 0.229508197 
02.13.03 16 94 0.170212766 
02.14.03 1 26 0.038461538 
02.26.03 50 143 0.34965035 
02.27.03 5 23 0.217391304 
02.28.03 4 78 0.051282051 
03.06.03 40 289 0.138408304 
03.14.03 4 30 0.133333333 
03.16.03 7 22 0.318181818 
03.17.03 19 110 0.172727273 




President Bush’s “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in 
West Point, New York” on June 1, 2002, was one of the most notable foreign policy speeches of 
his presidency. This address marked the inception of a defining and controversial element of the 
Bush Doctrine; it not only celebrated US military power and the uniquely American 
responsibility to promote peace and confront terrorism, but also expressed the Bush 
Administration’s willingness to wage preemptive, or more accurately, preventive, warfare to 
ensure American security (Bush [2002] 2013). This new military doctrine was an essential 
component of the Bush Administration’s grand strategy and is explained as follows:  
“For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of 
deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats 
also require new thinking. Deterrence… means nothing against shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when 
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or 
missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies… If we wait for threats to materialize, 
we will have waited too long… We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, 
and confront the worst threats before they emerge… Our security will require all 
Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when 
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives” (Bush [2002] 2013).  
This pronouncement rejected traditional military tactics of deterrence and containment and 
advocated for preventive war to proactively address potential security threats. These statements 
were intended to prepare the military and the country for the future War in Iraq. Yet despite the 
strategic intent of this speech, 32.4% of the word indicator rhetoric was ideological (Table 3). 
President Bush reiterated the dichotomy between good and evil as well as the values that unite 
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Americans and the international coalition against terrorism. He highlighted American efforts to 
“promote moderation and tolerance and human rights,” in addition to strategic interests and 
military policy in his address (Bush [2002] 2013).  
 President Bush’s “Remarks at a ‘Saluting Our Veterans’ Celebration in Ripley, West 
Virginia” on July 4, 2002, was significantly motivated by ideological interests, as 41.7% of total 
word indicators were ideological (Table 3). During this Fourth of July celebration, President 
Bush promoted the unity of the country and the bravery of American soldiers (Bush [2002] 
2013). Ideology was additionally important during his “Remarks at the Argonne National 
Laboratory” on July 22, 2002, as 47% of total word indicators were ideological (Table 3). 
President Bush commended the innovation of American scientists and emphasized their 
contributions to confronting new chemical and biological threats and enhancing counterterrorist 
tactics (Bush [2002] 2013). Towards the conclusion of his speech, President Bush discussed the 
importance of freedom, respect and tolerance in the US (Bush [2002] 2013).   
President Bush delivered two primarily ideologically speeches during this time period. 
His speech on September 11, 2002, “Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist 
Attacks,” was 59% ideological (Table 3) as President Bush commemorated the tragedy of 9/11 
and reiterated American values (Bush [2002] 2013). The second ideological speech was 
delivered on October 11, 2002, “Remarks on Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan” (Bush [2002] 
2013). 55% of word indicators in this speech were ideological due to President Bush’s rhetorical 
focus on the liberation of Afghani people and success of political reform in Afghanistan (Bush 
[2002] 2013).  
 President Bush’s “Address to the United Nations General Assembly” on September 12, 
2002, was a crucial speech in presenting the Bush Doctrine to the international community (Bush 
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[2002] 2013). He began by discussing Iraqi aggression during the Gulf War as well as the 
repression and human rights violations perpetrated by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein 
(Bush [2002] 2013). President Bush then detailed the history of Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions 
(Bush [2002] 2013). He demanded greater transparency and compliance with weapons 
inspections and implored Iraq to renounce terrorist involvement, cease nuclear weapons 
programs and cooperate with UN weapons inspectors (Bush [2002] 2013). President Bush 
declared Iraq’s failure to comply, despite stringent economic sanctions that have induced Iraqi 
suffering, as a violation of international law and a grave threat to the global community (Bush 
[2002] 2013). In the following segment from this speech, President Bush argued that the Iraqi 
regime was enhancing its nuclear weapon capabilities and withholding information from the UN:  
“Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure 
needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength 
alumninum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire 
fissible material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year… Iraq also 
possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilmeters permitted 
by the UN. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more 
long-range missiles, so that it can inflict mass death throughout the region” (Bush [2002] 
2013).  
Although President Bush had previously mentioned Iraq as part of the axis of evil, this speech 
was the first instance when President Bush made specific claims regarding the Iraqi weapons 
program. President Bush described Iraqi violations of international law in an attempt gain 
domestic and international support for the preventive war with Iraq. He additionally discussed 
the lack religious freedom, human dignity and liberty in Iraq to support his claims and justify 
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American willingness to wage preventive war (Bush [2002] 2013). 37.2% of total word 
indicators were ideological due to this emphasis on values (Bush [2002] 2013).  
 On October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered an “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” in 
which he continued to rationalize the possibility of preventive war (Bush [2002] 2013). In 
addition to underscoring current chemical and biological weapons stockpiles in Iraq as well as 
the regime’s capability to produce nuclear weapons, President Bush referred to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, conflating the Iraqi threat of weapons of mass destruction with Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks 
(Bush [2002] 2013). After describing Iraq’s threat to global peace and American security, 
President Bush immediately stated:  
“We must also never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September 11th, 
2001, America felt its vulnerability, even to threats that gather on the other side of the 
Earth. We resolved them and we are resolved today to confront every threat, from any 
source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America” (Bush [2002] 2013).  
This statement encouraged Americans to channel post-9/11 fears of terrorist attacks towards Iraq 
and Saddam Hussein, though these threats were unrelated. He further associated Saddam Hussein 
with the 9/11 attacks when he claimed, “Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists” and “Iraq and 
the Al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America” (Bush 
[2002] 2013). President Bush mentioned personal exchanges between Saddam Hussein and Al-
Qaeda leaders, Iraqi training sites for Al-Qaeda members and the public celebrations in Iraq after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bush [2002] 2013). He then applied his earlier assertion that the US 
would not distinguish between those who harbor terrorists and those who commit acts of 
terrorism to Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime, accusing the country of providing a safe haven to 
Al-Qaeda militants (Bush [2002] 2013).  
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 President Bush provided additional evidence for the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction, information which was rendered false after the invasion:  
“The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program… 
Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilites at sites that have been part of 
its nuclear program in the past… If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an 
amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a 
nuclear weapon in less than a year” (Bush [2002] 2013).  
He presented this unverified information as fact and instilled urgency in the threat posed by 
potential Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (Bush [2002] 2013). The reference to satellite 
photographs was especially compelling. Although President Bush’s rhetoric was predominantly 
strategic when discussing Iraq, he also alluded to underlying ideological goals related to Iraqi 
regime change when he declared, “If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies 
will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty in a unified 
Iraq at peace with its neighbors” (Bush [2002] 2013). This statement primarily seeks to 
emphasize the benevolent intentions of an American war. 
 President Bush delivered “Remarks at the Embassy of Afghanistan” on October 10, 2002. 
This speech was 36% ideological based on word indicator values as President Bush celebrated 
political reform and emphasized religious tolerance in addition to values of freedom and liberty 
(Bush [2002] 2013). On October 16, 2002, President Bush delivered “Remarks on Signing the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” which announced that 
Congress had explicitly authorized the president to employ military force against Iraq (Bush 
[2002] 2013). By October 2002, the US was prepared to declare war on Iraq, regardless of 
international consensus (Bush [2002] 2013). President Bush again outlined demands of Iraq, 
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including full disclosure of weapons of mass destruction, compliance with previous UN 
resolutions and an end to terrorist support, civilian persecution and illicit trade (Bush [2002] 
2013). This speech was 35.1% ideological (Table 4) and the President emphasized the need to 
liberate the Iraqi people from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein (Bush [2002] 2013).  
On January 1, 2003, President Bush addressed the troops at Ford Hood Texas, describing 
the military successes in Afghanistan and the American resilience in “fight[ing] this war on 
many fronts” (Bush [2003] 2013). He reiterated American demands of Saddam Hussein and 
reemphasized the threat posed by the Iraqi pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in order to 
support the Bush Administration’s willingness to wage preventive war in the following excerpt:  
“The use of military force is this Nation’s last option, its last choice. Yet, if force 
becomes necessary to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and enforce the will of 
the United Nations, if force becomes necessary to secure our country and to keep the 
peace, American will act deliberately, America will act decisively, and America will 
prevail because we’ve got the finest military in the world” (Bush [2003] 2013).  
 During his “State of the Union Address” on January 28, 2003, President Bush again 
referred to Americans as “liberators” in Afghanistan and celebrated American achievements in 
the War on Terror, praising intelligence and law enforcement agencies as well as Congress for 
implementing new strategies and legislation to augment national security (Bush [2003] 2013). 
He concluded his speech with another lengthy discussion about Saddam Hussein and Iraq:  
“Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, 
taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction… the only possible use 
he could have for those weapons is to dominate, intimidate, or attack… Evidence from 
intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody 
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reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. 
Secretly and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to 
terrorists or help them develop their own” (Bush [2003] 2013).  
President Bush’s tone conveys certainty that Saddam Hussein was not only harboring terrorists 
in Iraq, but also intended to develop weapons of mass destruction and distribute such weapons to 
the same terrorist network that conducted the 9/11 attacks.  
 President Bush continued to assert the presence of Iraqi nuclear weapons on February 6, 
2003, during his “Remarks on the Iraqi Regime’s Noncompliance with United Nations 
Resolutions.” Again, he accused Iraq of defying UN resolutions and revealed additional 
information about the nature of Iraqi weapons:  
“The Iraqi regime has acquired and tested the means to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction. All the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel 
tank modified to spray biological agents over wide areas… And we have sources that tell 
us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical 
weapons, the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have” (Bush [2003] 
2013).  
President Bush refers to Saddam Hussein as a “dictator” to emphasize the brutality of the Iraqi 
regime and gain support to attack this illiberal country. The escalation of evidence regarding the 
Iraqi weapons program also served to instill fear and generate domestic support for war.  
During a speech delivered at the American Enterprise Institute Dinner on February 26, 
2003, President Bush commemorated the work of the think tank and its scholars and continued 
his portrayal of Saddam Hussein as a tyrant and a dictator (Bush [2003] 2013). President Bush 
stated that “success in Iraq could also beging a new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in 
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motion progress towards a truly democratic state,” indicating an underlying goal to spread 
democracy throughout the region (Bush [2003] 2013). This rhetorical emphasis on democratic 
reform and freedom in the Middle East is apparent in the data, as 35% of total word indicators 
were ideological in this address (Table 5). On March 16, 2003, President Bush delivered a 
“Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People” (Bush [2003] 2013). 
This speech was also infused with ideological rhetoric, as 31.8% of the total word indicators 
were ideological (Table 5). President Bush pledged to prevent terrorists from finding a haven in 
Iraq and also expressed support for humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, 
projecting ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights (Bush [2003] 2013). On March 17, 
2003, President Bush repeated American grievances against Iraq and finally declared war on Iraq 
on March 19, 2003; both speeches included ideological motives for declaring war on Iraq, but 
primarily emphasized US strategic and military goals.  
Analysis 
Collectively, the rhetoric employed in President Bush’s addresses created a crescendo 
effect in intensifying the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and providing increasing evidence of 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. By capitalizing on America’s sense of vulnerability after 9/11 
and associating Saddam Hussein with terrorists, President Bush instilled fear among American 
citizens and presented the War in Iraq as a natural extension of the War on Terror. This process 
was gradual, beginning in June 2002 during his Commencement Address at West Point, 
escalating in September 2002 after his Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and culminating in the March 19, 2003, declaration of war on Iraq.   
Despite the primarily strategic content of President Bush’s foreign policy statements 
during this narrow time period, subtle patterns and trends exist among the speeches with 
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significant ideological rhetoric. Ideological word indicators were especially prominent when 
President Bush was addressing a religious audience, such as Muslim community leaders, or 
leading a prayer service to commemorate 9/11. In these speeches, he frequently emphasized 
American values of religious tolerance and freedom to worship without prejudice, specifically in 
reference to Islam. Speeches that memorialized 9/11 or addressed the military also included a 
greater amount of ideological word indicators, such as President Bush’s West Point 
Commencement speech, his address to the troops at Elmendorf Air Force Base and the Fourth of 
July Celebration. Ideological rhetoric was also apparent when President Bush discussed 
Afghanistan, as he framed the US troops as liberators and praised Afghani political reform and 
development. President Bush frequently invoked themes of patriotism and civic duty throughout 
his speeches when addressing public servants in order to instill a sense of mission among federal 
employees. Many of his speeches related to Iraq emphasized ideological objectives, yet the 
primary motivations of declaring war were based on threat assesments and goals to enhance US 
security. President Bush emphasized the superiority of American ideals to generate domestic and 
international support for American involvement in the Middle East.  
These results can be applied to the debate regarding whether the Bush Doctrine was 
influenced primarily by realism, liberalism or neoconservatism. The data support the scholars 
who classified the Bush Doctrine as realist due to the rhetorical prevalence of strategic interests 
in President Bush’s foreign policy addresses. President Bush expresses willingness to unilaterally 
pursue foreign policy goals and augment the US military in order to defend American security. 
These objectives focused on short-term security interests and are resoundingly realist in nature. 
Dueck, Daalder and Lindsay, and Lynch and Singh were correct in classifying this grand strategy 
as realist and challenging scholars who concluded that the Bush Doctrine stemmed from 
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neoconservative traditions. Langille, Monten, Schmidt and Williams classify the Bush Doctrine 
as neoconservative due to its vindicationist, crusading approach to promoting democracy abroad. 
Although they correctly emphasize the continued importance of democratic values in shaping US 
foreign policy, strategic rather than ideological interests influenced the early formation of the 
Bush Doctrine. Democracy promotion was an element of American wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, but the data demonstrates that security interests were at the forefront of the Bush Doctrine, 
especially in the developmental stages of this grand strategy.  
Owens provides an especially compelling argument that is consistent with the data and 
results: democracy promotion cannot be separated from national interests, as values are an 
essential component of US foreign policy. The ideological goals that President Bush expressed 
were encompassed within broader, strategic objectives to enhance American security and inspire 
unity among Americans over shared values. Hypothesis 1 was incorrect, as ideological rhetoric 
did not increase over time as was predicted, although it was infused within strategic foreign 













PUBLIC OPINION POLLS  
 
 In order to understand the significance of President Bush’s foreign policy rhetoric, 
specifically his use of ideological word imagery to justify strategic objectives, this research 
includes a selection of public opinion polls conducted in March 2003. These surveys demonstrate 
that President Bush’s rhetorical tactics were successful in garnering domestic support for the 
Bush Doctrine and yield insight into the impact of presidential rhetoric on the American public.  
Figure 5. Thinking specifically about the War on Terrorism, which two of the following 
issues concerns you the most? Removing Saddam Hussein from power, fighting Osama bin 
Laden and Al-Qaeda, stopping North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, fighting the long-
term conditions that breed terrorism abroad, improving homeland security, improving 
relations with the Muslim world, disarming Iraq, improving America’s intelligence 




































Figure 6. (As you may know, the United States decided today (March 17, 2003) that it 
would withdraw the latest UN (United Nations) resolution concerning disarmament of Iraq. 
In a speech to the nation tonight, President (George W.) Bush announced that the US will 
go to war with Iraq unless Saddam Hussein leaves Iraq in the next 48 hours.)…Do you 
think a war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power will make the US more or 



















Figure 7. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the 


















Figure 8. Do you think that the Bush Administration has or has not adequately prepared 
the American people and explained the risks involved in the United States going to war 


























Figure 9. Do you think the Bush Administration has presented enough evidence to show 




























Figure 10. Do you think that getting support from the United Nations Security Council is 
necessary before the United States goes to war with Iraq, or is support from the United 













This selection of public opinion polls conducted in March 2003 demonstrate that the 
Bush Administration, and President Bush himself, commanded broad public support for the 
invasion of Iraq immediately prior to the declaration of war. These figures also suggest that the 
Bush Administration’s rhetoric resonated with American citizens and successfully convinced the 
public of the necessity of preventive military action to ensure American security.  
Figure 5 shows that a greater percentage of Americans were concerned with removing 
Saddam Hussein from power (35%) than they were about fighting Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda (29%) (America on the Eve of War Survey 2003). These numbers indicate that the Bush 
Administration successfully channeled public attention away from the threat of terrorism and 
towards the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, conflating these distinct threats 
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whenever possible (America on the Eve of War Survey 2003). The wording of the survey 
question alone (“Thinking specifically about the war on terrorism, which two of the following 
issues concerns you the most?”) shows that Saddam Hussein had been effectively associated 
with the War on Terror rather than presented as a separate threat to American interests (America 
on the Eve of War Survey 2003). Figure 6 reiterates the Bush Administration’s successful 
connection between Saddam Hussein and the War on Terror, as 53% of Americans believed that 
removing Saddam Hussein from power would better protect Americans from terrorism 
(Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll 2003). Figure 7 also demonstrates that a significant majority, 
63% of Americans surveyed, approved of President Bush’s foreign policy approach to Iraq in 
March 2003, an implicit endorsement from the American public to preventively attack Iraq (CBS 
News Poll 2003).  
59% of Americans surveyed in March 2003 believed that the Bush Administration had 
“adequately prepared the American people and explained the risks involved in the United States 
going to war with Iraq,” as demonstrated in Figure 8 (NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll 2003). 
These figures suggest that the escalating rhetoric regarding the War in Iraq and President Bush’s 
numerous descriptions of the Iraqi threat had satisfied the American public (NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal Poll 2003). Figure 9 indicates that not only did a majority of Americans feel 
prepared for war, but also that 56% believed that the Bush Administration presented enough 
evidence to show that military action was immediately necessary in Iraq (CBS News Poll 2003).  
 Figure 10 additionally demonstrates that the majority of American’s supported the Bush 
Administration’s unilateral approach to the War in Iraq. Only 35% of Americans believed that 
support from the UN Security council was necessary before declaring war on Iraq, while 56% 
believed that it was only “desirable but not necessary” and 5% believed that it was “not 
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desirable” (ABC News Poll 2003). These results indicate a clear public endorsement of 
American unilateralism, pillar three of the Bush Doctrine.  
 Overall, these polls demonstrate the Bush Administration’s effectiveness in garnering 
public support for the War in Iraq. The majority of Americans associated dismantling Saddam 
Hussein’s regime with advancing the War on Terror. President Bush was rhetorically successful 
in framing the events leading to the declaration of war in Iraq and in persuading the public that 
the war would augment American security, indicating that Hypothesis 2 was correct.  
Analysis 
 The public opinions polls demonstrate that President Bush’s foreign policy speeches in 
the aftermath of 9/11 successfully garnered significant domestic support for the War in Iraq. In 
order to understand the Bush Administration’s high approval ratings, two essential questions 
remain in analyzing the Bush Doctrine and its impact on the American public: Which rhetorical 
strategies were employed in order to gain public support for the Bush Administration’s foreign 
policy objectives, specifically the War in Iraq, and why were these strategies so successful?  
 Chaim Kauffman addresses these questions in his article, “Threat Inflation and the 
Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War” (Kauffman 2004). He explores 
the assumption that “strong civic institutions and a robust marketplace of ideas” enable 
democracies to implement informed and effective foreign policies, yet counters this claim by 
arguing that the marketplace of ideas failed in the case of the Iraq War (Kauffman 2004: 5). 
Kauffman argues that the Bush Administration primarily relied on threat inflation and 
information suppression to justify the War in Iraq (Kauffman 2004: 5). The dissemination of 
unverified evidence to support foreign policy goals prevented the marketplace of ideas from 
challenging Bush Administration assumptions or presenting an alternative argument (Kauffman 
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2004: 5). The “administration officials persistently repeated only the most extreme threat claims 
and suppressed contrary evidence” to gain public support (Kaufmann 2004: 6).  
Kauffman lists the four primary arguments employed to inflate the threat of Saddam 
Hussein, which were eventually proven false:  
(1) “he was an almost uniquely undeterrable aggressor who would seek any opportunity 
to kill Americans virtually regardless of risk to himself or his country; (2) he was 
cooperating with Al-Qaeda and had even assisted in the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks against the United States; (3) he was close to acquiring nuclear weapons; and 
(4) he possessed chemical and biological weapons that could be used to devastating 
effect against American civilians at home or US troops in the Middle East” 
(Kaufmann 2004: 6). 
He argues that because the executive branch directly controls the dissemination of national 
intelligence information and enjoys authority in matters of foreign policy, the Bush 
Administration was able to both “shape public perceptions through selective release - or 
suppression - of analyses and information” (Kauffman 2004: 37) and control the agenda for the 
debate, giving critics “limited if any opportunity to present a coherent opposing narrative” 
(Kauffman 2004: 42).  
Kauffman also cites many examples of intelligence assessments that contrasted Bush 
Administration claims that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons program (Kauffman 2004: 
19). Bush Administration officials asserted that Iraq was only six months away from building a 
nuclear weapon and argued that only preventive war would prevent Iraq from acquiring the 
fissile material necessary to develop a nuclear bomb (Kauffman 2004: 21). Kauffman states, 
“careful phrasing of official rhetoric can allow even claims with especially weak evidentiary 
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bases to be persuasive to the public” (Kaufmann 2004: 42-43). This was especially apparent in 
the Bush Administration’s purported connection between Saddam Hussein and 9/11, as officials 
repeatedly gave “the impression that there was a causal link without actually say so” (Kaufmann 
2004: 43). By portraying Saddam Hussein as producer of weapons of mass destruction with 
terrorist network alliances, the Bush Administration instilled fear that an even more destructive 
terrorist attack with nuclear weapons was inevitable (Kaufmann 2004: 43). This allowed the 
Bush Administration to frame the Iraq case as preventing terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, 
rather than containing a dictator (Kaufmann 2004: 46).  
Kauffman’s analysis includes reports published by several intelligence agencies, which 
contradicted the purported association between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 terrorists but did not 
successfully discredit Bush Administration assertions (Kauffman 2004). A 2002 Special National 
Intelligence Estimate “concluded that Hussein was unlikely to initiative an unprovoked WMD 
attack against the United States” (Kaufmann 2004: 11), American and British intelligence 
agencies agreed that Iraq was at least four years away from producing fissile material and reports 
published by the British Foreign Ministry in 2002 stated that Iraq would be incapable of 
producing a nuclear weapon with current UN sanctions (Kauffman 2004: 24). Most convincingly, 
the IAEA conducted “unhindered” inspections from December 2002 to March 2003, which 
“eliminated virtually all remaining doubt” in concluding that Iraq did not possess weapons of 
mass destruction (Kaufmann 2004: 25).  
Despite the overwhelming evidence against Bush Administration claims, officials 
continued to emphasize the imminence of a nuclear Iraq (Kauffman 2005: 25). Kaufmann 
explains that because very few political officials or media reporters challenged the Bush 
Administration or questioned American motives to invade Iraq, the democratic marketplace of 
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ideas failed to facilitate public debate (Kaufmann 2004: 30). He concludes that political 
opposition “cannot be counted on reliably in foreign policy debates,” as neither the press nor 
independent experts can control threat inflation (Kaufmann 2004: 43).  
In the spring of 2005, Ronald Krebs critiqued Kaufmann’s article in International 
Security (Krebs 2005: 196). Although Krebs agrees that the Bush Administration exaggerated 
threats and manipulated intelligence information, he argues that the executive branch has less 
power in shaping the public foreign policy debate than Kaufmann assumes (Krebs 2005: 199). 
Krebs additionally criticizes Kaufmann for diminishing the impact of 9/11 on the marketplace of 
ideas and the American psyche (Krebs 2005: 200). He believes that 9/11 “reshaped the rhetorical 
space within which political disputes would be waged” and enabled the Bush Administration to 
engage in “rhetorical coercion” to garner support for the War in Iraq and silence opposition 
(Krebs 2005: 200). Terrorist attacks are rare, difficult to control, and are “unusually salient and 
thus lead to exaggerated risk perception” (Krebs 2005: 200). Because Americans were frightened 
after 9/11, they overestimated risk and focused on the possibility, rather than the unlikely 
probability, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (Krebs 2005: 201).  
Krebs furthers his analysis of the Bush Administration’s “rhetorical coercion” in his 
article with Jennifer Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to 
War in Iraq” (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). These scholars analyze President Bush’s rhetorical 
devices and question why Democratic opponents in particular did not publicly criticize the Bush 
Administration’s foreign policy agenda (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). Krebs and Lobasz’s central 
argument is that “the effective fixing of the meaning of the September 11 attacks in terms of the 
‘War on Terror’ substantially circumscribed the political debate,” which allowed the Bush 
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Administration’s discourse to dominate public discussion and prevent the emergence of opposing 
narratives (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 409).  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the country turned to President Bush for leadership, and thus 
President Bush was required to utilize rhetoric that would “identify the perpetrators, explain what 
they wanted, reaffirm the nation’s ideals, and reassure the public that security would be restored” 
(Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 433). Krebs and Lobasz assert that this “rhetoric of crisis” contributed 
to the perpetration of the “rhetoric of identity,” which reaffirms national ideals but does not 
articulate policy responses (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 433). This “rhetoric of identity” was 
favored over a “pragmatic rhetoric,” which placed “Bush’s preferred interpretation in a 
particularly advantageous rhetorical position” (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 425). Krebs and Lobasz 
classified this “rhetoric of identity” as “epideictic” due to its emphasis on shared values in order 
to unite and comfort Americans in terms that resonated with the general public (Krebs and 
Lobasz 2007: 322).  
This epideictic foreign policy rhetoric consisted of subtle linguistic devices that 
augmented public support for the Bush Doctrine (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 425). President Bush 
portrayed the US as a victim of a horrific terrorist attack and his Administration employed 
traditional political discourse that celebrated the exceptional nature of American values (Krebs 
and Lobasz 2007: 425). President Bush additionally utilized language that indicated “‘we’ were 
attacked because of ‘who we are,’ not because of ‘what we have done’” (Krebs and Lobasz 
2007: 422-423). This approach allowed the US to reject any potential blame for the terrorist 
attacks, ignoring a history of financing authoritarian regimes, unconditionally supporting Israel 
and promoting economic dependency in the Middle East, in addition to many other foreign 
policy decisions that drove terrorist networks to seek retaliation (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 424). 
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By ignoring these realities, President Bush portrayed the 9/11 attacks as a violent manifestation 
of anti-American sentiment and an Islamic backlash against globalization and dysfunctional 
domestic governments in the Middle East (Krebs and Lobasz 423). Although some critics 
presented the alternative narrative, which took responsibility for the negative impact of 
American involvement in the Middle East, the Bush Administration’s rhetorical approach 
became the “hegemonic interpretation” (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 424).  
President Bush additionally portrayed American adversaries, specifically the 9/11 
terrorists and Saddam Hussein, as “evil” (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). The religious imagery 
associated with this depiction, specifically related to Satan’s influence, resonated strongly with 
the political Christian culture in American society (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 428). President Bush 
defined the terrorists “as figures of repression and intolerance,” conjuring memories of fascist 
and communist enemies from American history (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 428). This 
representation of terrorists as antithetical to American values encouraged citizens to support 
foreign policy strategies that would address sources of evil in the world and allowed the Bush 
Administration to connect the War on Terror with the “promotion of political freedom, 
democracy, and free markets” (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 428). In his foreign policy statements, 
President Bush “suggested that the stake in the War on Terror was something even more 
fundamental than the lives of American citizens: the survival of democracy at home” (Krebs and 
Lobasz 2007: 429). These rhetorical devices allowed President Bush to gain public support for 
war against all US enemies and prepare citizens for potential costs that the US might incur for 
representing and defending freedom (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 429).   
This analysis additionally addresses the association portrayed between the War on Terror 
and Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 441). Krebs and Lobasz believe 
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that the Bush Administration encouraged an association between Iraq and terrorist networks by 
classifying Iraq as part of the axis of evil, accentuating common values between Saddam Hussein 
and Al-Qaeda and emphasizing human rights violations in Iraq (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 441). 
The emphasis on Saddam Hussein as the leader of Iraq served as a powerful parallel to Osama 
bin Laden, the leader of the 9/11 attacks (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 441). Because terrorism defies 
traditional conceptions of the nation-state, Krebs and Lobasz explain that the Bush 
Administration insinuated links between Al-Qaeda and Iraq in order to explain the tragic attacks 
of 9/11 to the public (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 442). The Bush Administration was not the first to 
refer to the evil of Saddam Hussein and his regime, as President Bush Sr. referred to Saddam 
Hussein as “Hitler revisited” during the Gulf War and President Clinton later accused Saddam 
Hussein of harboring terrorists (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 443). Krebs and Lobasz assert, 
“Hussein’s credentials as a figure of imposing evil and as a Middle Eastern Hitler were thus well 
established by the time Bush included his regime in the axis of evil,” which undoubtedly assisted 
the Bush Administration in generating support for the War in Iraq (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 443).  
This rhetoric, which criminalized Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and projected the dominant War 
on Terror narrative, prevented Democrats from articulating viable opposition arguments to the 
Bush Administration’s justification for war and led to “rhetorical coercion” (Krebs and Lobasz 
2007: 445). Krebs and Lobasz claim that because the American public looks to the president to 
determine foreign policy in the wake of a national crisis, “to challenge that leader’s epideictic 
claims is to implicitly undermine that function and thus to challenge its very authority” (Krebs 
and Lobasz 2007: 435). Democrats did not question the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in 
order to avoid destroying the very unity that the rhetoric sought to enhance, although many were 
unconvinced by the claims of weapons of mass destruction (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 434). The 
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Bush Administration was able to command a majority of public support for unilateral action in 
declaring war against Iraq by 2003 (Krebs and Lobasz: 2007: 448). Krebs and Lobasz conclude 
by arguing that hegemonic discourses, though pervasive, must be challenged in order to 
thoroughly consider and potentially implement alternative policies (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 
451).  
 This analysis reveals the importance of an active marketplace of ideas and the 
dissemination of verified information as well as the influence of presidential rhetoric on public 
support for foreign policy objectives. The Bush Administration withheld and manipulated 
information and emphasized ideological values to frame strategic goals, rhetorical strategies that 





























ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES  
 
This research additionally analyzes National Security Strategies from the Clinton, Bush 
and Obama Administrations using content analysis to assess variation in presidential rhetoric and 
trends of change and continuity in US foreign policy. National Security Strategies yield insight 
into the distribution of the strategic and ideological interests that determine US foreign policy 
and national security goals. An assessment of these documents will contribute to a more 
conclusive interpretation of the Bush Doctrine within the context of the foreign policies pursued 
before and after this grand strategy.   
The analysis uses the same word indicator methodology utilized with President Bush’s 
public statements. Figure 11 presents data from the Clinton Administration’s 1995 National 
Security Strategy; Figure 12 presents data from the Bush Administration’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy; and Figure 13 presents data from the Obama Administration’s 2010 National 
Security Strategy.  
 
Figure 11. Total Frequencies and Percentages of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators 








Figure 12. Total Frequencies and Percentages of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators 






Figure 13. Total Frequencies and Percentages of Strategic and Ideological Word Indicators 





 The data presented in Figures 11, 12 and 13 indicate that strategic word indicators are 
predominant in National Security Strategies across presidential administrations. In each NSS, 
ideological word indicators were less than 25% of the total word indicators. The Clinton 
Administration had the lowest percentage of ideological word indicators, as only 13% of total 
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word indicators were ideological. The Bush Administration employed a greater percentage of 
ideological word indicators than the Obama Administration, as 24% of word indicators were 
ideological in the Bush NSS, while 22% of total word indicators were ideological in the 2010 
Obama NSS. Despite policy shifts, administration changes and the increase in ideological word 
indicators from the Clinton Administration to the Bush Administration, US foreign policy 
rhetoric is consistently infused with varying amounts of ideological language to support strategic 
objectives. 
Clinton Administration 1995 National Security Strategy 
 The data in Figure 7 show that out of the total 361 word indicators in the Clinton NSS, 47 
(13%) were ideological and 314 (87%) were strategic. This distribution exemplifies the Clinton 
Administration’s focus on national security in the aftermath of the Cold War and emphasis on 
maintaining military supremacy to suppress aggressive states and defend against external threats 
(White House 1995). The NSS preface stated, “protecting our nation’s security – our people, our 
territory and our way of life – is my Administration’s foremost mission and constitutional duty” 
(White House 1995: i). The central goals were outlined as follows:  
• “To sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight.  
• To bolster America’s economic revitalization.  
• To promote democracy abroad” (White House 1995: i).  
These goals emphasized the interconnectedness of domestic and foreign policies in ensuring 
American security as well as the Clinton Administration’s dedication to advancing economic 
interests to strengthen America’s influence abroad (White House 1995).  




“If we assert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous – 
by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by 
opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and tackling global problems. 
Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our 
opportunities will narrow” (White House 1995: i).  
This excerpt alluded to the Clinton grand strategy of selective engagement, which favored 
limited involvement in the global community and engagement only when it would serve 
American security goals (White House 1995). The US hoped to dedicate resources when issues 
were central to American interests, but the Clinton Administration struggled to determine which 
regional tensions compelled American involvement during the 1990s. Regardless of the 
difficulties in determining the appropriate use of American power, the Clinton Administration 
assumed that the US served as an “indispensable nation” in the global community and the 1995 
NSS consistently emphasized the benefits of American leadership (White House 1995).  
The Clinton Administration also expressed American willingness to operate both 
unilaterally and multilaterally in order to best serve US security interests: “When our national 
security is threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if 
we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must” (White House 1995: ii). 
Although the Clinton Administration preferred to use alliances and diplomacy to achieve goals in 
the international arena, President Clinton explicitly reserved the right to act forcefully and 
unilaterally if the situation required such action (White House 1995).  
 Democracy promotion was depicted as a central goal in the preface of the Clinton NSS to 
enhance American security, but ideological interests are limited in the Clinton Administration’s 
grand strategy, as reflected by the few ideological word indicators used (White House 1995). 
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Although the Clinton Administration devoted a section of the NSS to democracy promotion, this 
strategy is embedded within overall goals to enhance American security (White House 1995). 
The Clinton Administration did not advocate for democracy promotion for the mere purpose of 
spreading American values abroad, but because foreign policy officials believed that a world 
with more liberal governments would best enhance American security (White House 1995). The 
NSS stated, “All of America’s strategic interests – from promoting prosperity at home to 
checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory – are served by enlarging the 
community of democratic and free market nations” (White House 1995: 22). The Clinton 
Administration expressed goals to engage with other democracies to cooperate on issues of 
security and economy (White House 1995). The NSS also outlined objectives to expand 
democracy and free markets in regions of strategic importance of the US, specifically Russia and 
Central and Eastern Europe (White House 1995). Yet the Clinton Administration only briefly 
referred to American values in the NSS (White House 1995).  
 The NSS conclusion reiterated the necessity of American engagement in the international 
community:  
“Our Administration is committed to explaining our security interests and objectives to 
the nation; to seeking the broadest possible public and congressional support for our 
security programs and investments; and to exerting our leadership in the world in a 
manner that reflects our best national values and protects the security of this great and 
good nation” (White House 1995: 33).  
The data and rhetoric of this document were strategic in content and motivation, reflecting the 




Bush Administration 2002 National Security Strategy  
Scholars point to the Bush 2002 National Security Strategy (Figure 8), which was 
published on September 20, 2002, as the most comprehensive and detailed enunciation of the 
Bush Doctrine. The data in Figure 7 shows that of the total 478 word indicators used in the Bush 
NSS, 24% of the total word indicators were ideological and 76% were strategic. The overview of 
the Bush NSS emphasized America’s unparalleled power and influence in the international 
community, which “must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom” (White 
House 2002: 1). The Bush Administration defined its central national security goals as “political 
and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity” 
(White House 2002: 1). In order to achieve these goals, the NSS proposes forging alliances to 
address regional conflict and defend against global terrorism, specifically related to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (White House 2002: 1).  
Although the NSS expressed hope for a multilateral foreign policy, like the Clinton 
Administration, the Bush Administration reserved the right to act unilaterally if the US did not 
receive global support from the United Nations or traditional alliances:  
“In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment and interests of our 
friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique 
responsibilities require… We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our 
determination to secure together, with our allies and friends, our shared fundamental 
interests and values” (White House 2002: 31).  
This willingness to pursue national security goals unilaterally refers to the third pillar of the Bush 
Doctrine, an essential element of the Bush Administration’s grand strategy.   
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The NSS additionally referred to new enemies and threats in the post-9/11 world, 
specifically terrorist networks equipped with modern technology and rogue states with the 
potential to acquire weapons of mass destruction (White House 2002: 14). The document defines 
and identifies rogue states, specifically Iraq, Iran and North Korea:  
“Rogue states...brutalize their own people…display no regard for international law…and 
callously violate international treaties…they are determined to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction…sponsor terrorism around the global…and reject basic human values and 
hate the United States and everything for which it stands” (White House 2002: 14).  
This definition depicted rogue states as antithetical to American values and enhanced Bush 
Administration claims that such states would provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist 
networks (White House 2002: 14). The Bush NSS rejected the traditional American reliance on 
military strategies of containment and advocated for preventive warfare to prevent rogue states 
from compromising American security: “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and our allies and friends” (White House 2002: 14).  
The Bush Administration also highlighted national security objectives to “ignite a new 
era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade” (White House 2002: 1) as 
well as “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of 
democracy” (White House 2002: 2). The Bush Administration vowed to “make freedom and the 
development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations” (White House 
2002: 4). The NSS dedicated a section to developing democratic infrastructure abroad and 
outlined foreign aid goals to assist developing countries (White House 2002: 22). These efforts 
included improving the efficiency of the World Bank and enhancing public health and 
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agricultural development (White House 2002: 22). Although these objectives project ideological 
interests, they were embedded within overall strategic goals to enhance national security (White 
House 2002).  
 The Bush NSS additionally asserted the universality of American ideals and American 
hegemony in the global community, as described by the fourth pillar of the Bush Doctrine 
(White House 2002). The NSS declared, “The United States must defend liberty and justice 
because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these 
aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them” (White House 2002: 3). This document 
additionally emphasized the US priority to “disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global 
reach and attack their leadership,” specifically by preventing funds from reaching terrorist 
networks (White House 2002: 5). The Bush Administration concluded the NSS by emphasizing 
that domestic strength would ensure national security, as “the foundation of American strength is 
at home” (White House 2002: 31).  
The data indicate that while the NSS contained an ideological component, strategic goals 
were predominant throughout the NSS. These findings are consistent with the data from 
President Bush’s foreign policy speeches.  
Obama Administration 2010 National Security Strategy  
Figure 9 demonstrates that of the total 495 word indicators in the 2010 Obama National 
Security Strategy, 107 (22%) of these word indicators were ideological while 388 (78%) were 
strategic. The overview of the Obama NSS emphasized renewing American leadership to 
effectively confront 21st century challenges within the global community:  
“Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so 
that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. We will do so by 
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building upon the sources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order 
that can meet the challenges of our time. This strategy recognizes the fundamental 
connection between our national security, our national competitiveness, resilience, and 
moral example” (White House 2010: 1).  
The Obama Administration highlighted the importance of domestic improvements in order to 
confront security threats from abroad. The NSS stated, “our national security begins at home” 
(White House 2010: 9) and argued that the US must enhance “soft power,” or “American 
military might, economic competitiveness, moral leadership, global engagement, and efforts to 
shape an international system that serves the mutual interests of nations and people” (White 
House 2010: 7). This document summarized strategies to advance education, innovation and 
technology and foster greater collaboration throughout the federal government to successfully 
implement the NSS proposals (White House 2010).  
In addressing the US strategic approach to enhancing national security, the Obama 
Administration outlined central grand strategy objectives:  
• “The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners; 
• A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic 
system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;  
• Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and  
• An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and 
opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges” (White House 2010: 
7).  
The Obama NSS focused on renewing a “stronger foundation for American leadership” that is 
both “strong and responsible” (White House 2010 2010: 7). This emphasis on renewal indicated 
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an implicit acknowledgement of the declining American reputation abroad after global criticism 
for US involvement in Iraq.   
 The Obama NSS advocated for American involvement in international institutions to 
effectively engage in the global community (White House 2010: 3). Foreign policy officials 
sought to cement alliances to ensure that shared global interests were met (White House 2010: 3). 
This document enunciated the multilateral grand strategy that the Obama Administration 
favored:  
“The modernization of institutions, strengthening of international norms, and 
enforcement of international law is not a task for the United States alone – but together 
with like-minded nations, it is a task we can lead. A key source of American leadership 
throughout history has been enlightened self-interest… The belief that our own interests 
are bound to the interests of those beyond our borders will continue to guide our 
engagement with nations and peoples” (White House 2010: 3).  
Although the Obama Administration hoped to maintain a global leadership role, the NSS 
advocated for enhanced integration and collaboration within the global community to address 
goals and challenges, seeking to engage other nations “on the basis of mutual interests and 
mutual respect”  (White House 2010: 11). The Obama NSS additionally commended the 
American multilateral approach in the post-World War II era and addressed the Bush 
Administration’s tendency to reject United Nations involvement:  
“In recent years America’s frustration with international institutions has led us at times to 
engage the United Nations (UN) on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnational 
challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system, 
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working from inside international institutions and frameworks to face their imperfections 
head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation” (White House 2010: 13).  
This statement is another reference to the War in Iraq and an acknowledgment that the Obama 
Administration intended to adhere to international law and work within the global community, 
despite the imperfection of multilateral institutions (White House 2010: 13). The Obama NSS 
demonstrates a realist foreign policy strategy centered on multilateral involvement in the global 
community and domestic advancements to strengthen American influence.  
Analysis 
The predominance of strategic rhetoric throughout the Clinton, Bush and Obama National 
Security Strategies indicates that Hypothesis 3 was correct in predicting that rhetoric would be 
consistent across administrations. Each NSS rhetorically prioritized strategic interests, framed 
democracy promotion as a tactic to achieve broader security goals and emphasized the benefits 
of American leadership in the global community. The Bush NSS most aggressively asserted the 
universality of American values and argued that the global community should seek the same 
democratic freedoms that Americans enjoy. Assertions of universal applicability of American 
values are notably absent in the Clinton and Obama grand strategies, although each National 
Security Strategies praised American ideals.  
Overall, the Clinton and Bush Administration’s National Security Strategies were very 
similar and the Obama Administration NSS demonstrated the greatest departure from trends in 
US foreign policy and rhetoric. Although the Clinton and Bush Administrations addressed the 
connection between domestic strength and international influence, the Obama Administration 
placed a particular emphasis on ensuring national prosperity in order to maintain the “soft 
power” necessary to enhance US influence in the international community and restore the 
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tarnished American reputation abroad. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations expressed the 
hope for multilateral support in pursuing American interests and the importance of American 
leadership in the global community, but emphasized American willingness to pursue goals 
unilaterally. But the Obama Administration rejected unilateral action and prioritized American 
engagement in the global community within the confines of international institutions, 
representing a shift in foreign policy goals and rhetoric. The Obama Administration’s emphasis 
on multilateralism and apologies for prior American digressions from global norms represents 

































CHANGE VERSUS CONTINUITY  
 
This research demonstrates that the Bush Doctrine represented continuity in US foreign 
policy objectives but a shift in the strategies employed to achieve these goals. Dueck classifies 
“strategic adjustment” as the realignment of strategic and ideological priorities that occur after 
external shocks threaten American security (Dueck 2006: 37). A shift in grand strategy may 
encompass modifications to “military spending, alliance commitments, foreign aid, diplomatic 
activism, and/or foreign policy stands toward potential adversaries” (Dueck 2006: 13). Strategic 
adjustments may be “first order,” indicating a significant change in foreign policy 
implementation, or “second order,” signaling a less drastic change (Dueck 2006: 37). The Bush 
Administration’s grand strategy would constitute a second order strategic adjustment due to the 
change in military strategies implemented to ensure American security against potential 
adversaries but the continuity of realist foreign policy goals across presidential administrations.  
The Bush Administration’s focus on strategic interests, rhetorical emphasis on American 
ideals, willingness to pursue strategic goals unilaterally and the importance of American 
hegemony represent trends of continuity within the Bush Doctrine. The grand strategies of the 
Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations consistently prioritized strategic interests, as 
demonstrated by the prevalence of strategic word indicators throughout the data. Yet each 
administration included ideological word indicators to explain strategic objectives, indicating a 
consistent influence of liberal ideals on US foreign policy. President Bush emphasized 
democratic values in his public statements to gain support for the Bush Doctrine, but his 
projection of American ideals to gain support for policy objectives does not represent a shift in 
presidential rhetoric.   
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Scholars resoundingly agree that unilateralism, the third pillar of the Bush Doctrine, was 
consistent with US foreign policy tradition. Leffler, Lynch and Singh provide compelling 
historical cases to bolster their assertions of continuity. The Bush Administration’s willingness to 
declare war without support from the United Nations appears drastic, but the decision to take 
action independently is consistent with US foreign policy tradition rather than an aberration from 
multilateral trends. The US has frequently executed foreign policies without support from the 
international community and disregarded global consensus. Although President Bush sought 
support from the United Nations for the War in Iraq, he was clear throughout his public 
statements that his primary intent was to defend American security, regardless of international 
consensus. He referred to the coalition of nations that were assisting US counterterrorism efforts, 
but mention of alliances was infrequent in his public statements and largely absent when 
discussing Iraq. The majority of Americans surveyed believed that United Nations support for 
the war was unnecessary, further indicating that unilateral action was supported by the public 
and not unprecedented in US foreign policy.  
Continuity is also apparent in President Bush’s emphasis on American hegemony, the 
fourth pillar of the Bush Doctrine. Many presidential administrations, notably the Clinton 
Administration, emphasized the importance of the US as an international leader and America’s 
“indispensable” role in the global community. President Bush’s rhetoric aggressively asserted 
these values, as he consistently portrayed American ideals as superior and refers to the US as 
“the greatest country in the world.” His dichotomous rhetoric emphasizes “good versus evil” and 
“with us or against us” and presents American foreign policies as universally beneficial. 
President Bush’s language in foreign policy speeches and in the 2002 NSS most aggressively 
depicts American values as universally applicable. Yet American exceptionalism has endured 
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throughout US foreign policy and many presidential administrations have assumed that 
American leadership and values will benefit the global community. Although President Bush’s 
rhetoric to express this universality was more assertive than previous administrations, his overall 
tone does not signify change in US foreign policy goals.  
The War in Iraq also indicates consistency in US foreign policy. During the First Gulf 
War, the US received significant criticism regarding the goals of the invasion and the 
international community questioned why Saddam Hussein was not removed from power. Iraq 
represented an unfinished foreign policy objective in the Middle East. The Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait provided the justification for American intervention during the First Gulf War, while 
assumed presence of weapons of mass destruction served as an impetus for action during the 
2003 War in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein, who had been continuously depicted as a ruthless 
dictator. The Bush Jr. Administration foreign policy strategy towards Iraq thus constitutes a 
continuation of the Bush Sr. Administration’s foreign policy.  
Yet the preventive declaration of war on Iraq embodies a change in the military strategies 
employed to defend American security. Although the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations 
prioritized strategic interests over ideological goals and implemented realist-based grand 
strategies, the Bush Doctrine represents a shift in the policies implemented to achieve American 
interests abroad; therefore the preventive war pillar of the Bush Doctrine represents a departure 
from US foreign policy tradition. Daalder and Lindsay were correct in asserting that the War in 
Iraq represents a key exception to the overall continuity of foreign policy in the Bush Doctrine, 
as this preventive war represented an overhaul of decades of US military and foreign policy 
strategies that relied on deterrence and containment. Some scholars, such as Leffler, Lynch and 
Singh, argue that the Bush Administration’s declaration of preventive war in Iraq did not 
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constitute a change in US foreign policy. Yet these analyses are superficial and fail to 
acknowledge the crucial difference between considering and waging preventive war.  
The 2002 Commencement Speech at West Point additionally represents a departure from 
traditional presidential rhetoric, despite the continued emphasis on strategic goals. Daalder and 
Lindsay note that President Bush was the first president to explicitly state the American 
willingness to wage preemptive and preventive war. Previously, this possibility was always 
assumed and preemptive war has been frequently declared in US history. But the introduction of 
preventive war to US military strategy and President Bush’s continued references to the 
possibility of preventive war with Iraq in subsequent speeches constitutes change in presidential 
rhetoric.  
Although it is clear from this data that early motivations for the War in Iraq were 
centered on security interests, many scholars noted that the Bush Administration intensified 
democracy promotion efforts once weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq. A further 
analysis of additional foreign policy speeches in later years of the Bush presidency, specifically 
in 2004, may indicate a more apparent shift in foreign policy from strategic to ideological 
interests. Yet it is abundantly clear that strategic interests dictated preliminary foreign policy 
objectives and therefore the Bush Doctrine constitutes a realist grand strategy, which is 













THE OBAMA GRAND STRATEGY  
 
An evaluation of President Obama’s foreign policy decisions will better contextualize the 
Bush Doctrine and determine whether the Obama Administration’s foreign policy goals 
represent change or continuity from the Bush Administration’s grand strategy. This analysis will 
additionally yield insight into the direction of US foreign policy under President Obama.  
In “The Emerging Obama Doctrine,” Masoud Kazemzadeh identifies six key elements of 
the President Obama’s grand strategy: preventing the global proliferation of nuclear weapons; 
implementing counterterrorist efforts to defeat extremist groups; engaging multilaterally in the 
international community to achieve foreign policy goals; utilizing effective incentives and 
stringent punishments in negotiations to ensure that states adhere to global norms; augmenting 
“soft power,” to “entice others to follow American leadership voluntarily”; and prioritizing 
democratic ideals in executing US foreign policy (Kazemzadeh 2010 194-195). According to 
Kazemzadeh, the key difference between the Bush and Obama Doctrines is the method of 
engagement in the global community (Kazemzadeh 2010: 195). While Obama values multilateral 
institutions and believes the US should cooperate with other nations in order to resolve global 
challenges, President Bush disregarded global consensus in his decision to unilaterally declare 
war on Iraq (Kazemzadeh 2010: 194). Yet Kazemzadeh argues that both presidents understood 
the importance of American power in improving the global community, despite contrasting 
opinions regarding the best policies to enhance American influence abroad (Kazemzadeh 2010: 
195).  
Leslie Gelb contributes to this analysis in “The Elusive Obama Doctrine” (Gelb 2012: 
18). He praises President Obama’s ability to remain politically centrist regarding foreign policy 
and attributes this success to the Obama Administration’s use of realist rhetoric and action, 
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specifically the words “interests” and “power,” which resonate with foreign policy scholars and 
the American public (Gelb 2012: 19). This rhetoric is a definitive shift from President Bush’s 
epideictic rhetoric, which emphasized American identity and shared values to enhance unity 
(Krebs and Lobasz 2007). Gelb additionally applauds President Obama’s efforts to restore 
America’s reputation and moderate US power abroad (Gelb 2012: 19-20). President Obama and 
his advisers recognize the success of American military might in conventional warfare, but Gelb 
asserts that they also acknowledge, “conventional military superiority cannot pacify countries or 
resolve civil wars and vast internal conflicts” (Gelb 2012: 20).  
Yet Gelb furthers this argument by claiming that while President Obama recognizes the 
shortcomings of American power, he does not fully appreciate the benefits, specifically when 
military strength is accompanied by effective foreign policy strategies (Gelb 2012: 18). Although 
President Obama successfully led the mission that killed Osama bin Laden, implemented drone 
strikes to target terrorist networks and withdrew of American troops from Iraq by the end of 
2011, Gelb criticizes President Obama as being unable to think strategically, leading 
international policymakers to question his intentions in the global arena (Gelb 2012: 21). Gelb 
categorizes Obama’s approach to “humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion” as 
“inconsistent” (Gelb 2012: 24). Although President Obama supported intervention in Libya after 
receiving encouragement from the Arab League and the United Nations, as discussed by Feith 
and Cropsey, the Administration has been hesitant to follow suit in Syria and no military action 
has been taken (Gelb 2012: 24-25). President Obama has additionally struggled in managing 
Egyptian democratic reform due to concern that democratic elections would yield an extremist 
government that does not support American interests (Gelb 2012: 25). Gelb is also critical of 
President Obama’s failure to prioritize economic development in the US within his national 
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security strategy, claiming that he must demonstrate that “declining economic vitality destroys 
American power and undermines US interests” (Gelb 2012: 28). Although the Obama 
Administration’s National Security Strategy emphasizes restoring domestic vitality, Gelb hopes 
that President Obama will focus on improving the domestic economy to ensure that the US 
maintains a global lead in military power and technological innovation (Gelb 2012: 28).  
Many scholars identify President Obama’s remarks to the Muslim world in Cairo on June 
4, 2009 as an embodiment of many key concepts of the Obama Administration’s grand strategy 
and a representation of his foreign policy rhetoric. In this speech, President Obama states his 
goal in addressing this particular audience:  
“I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims 
around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based 
upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. 
Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; 
tolerance and the dignity of all human beings” (Obama [2009] 2013).  
President Obama acknowledges the historical tensions between the US and Muslim communities, 
specifically referencing colonialism, the Cold War and most importantly, recent conflict in the 
aftermath of globalization, which many Muslims perceive as threatening to Islamic traditions 
(Obama [2009] 2013). President Obama projected the “alternative narrative” that Krebs and 
Lobasz discuss in their analysis of President Bush’s epideictic rhetoric by taking responsibility 
for US foreign policy mistakes in the Middle East (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 425). Yet President 
Obama frames these tensions as an impetus for cooperation between the US and the Muslim 
world, rather than cause for violence, as he seeks to promote unity to collectively confront the 
terrorist threat and enhance global security (Obama [2009] 2013).  
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 President Obama expressed efforts to prevent the permeation of negative stereotypes 
towards Muslims in the US and clarified that despite American wars with Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, “America is not – and never will be – at war with Islam” (Obama [2009] 2013). This 
echoed many of President Bush’s early statements, but President Obama more assertively 
enunciated this distinction and sympathized with Muslims who unfairly experienced 
discrimination after 9/11 (Obama [2009] 2013).  
In the Cairo speech, President Obama directly challenged President Bush’s unilateral 
approach with regards to Iraq when he asserted:  
“Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was a war of choice that provoked strong differences in my 
country and around the world. Although I believe that the Iraqi people are ultimately 
better off without the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, I also believe that events in Iraq have 
reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to 
resolve our problems whenever possible” (Obama [2009] 2013).  
President Obama prioritized multilateralism in US foreign policy and acknowledged the 
contentious domestic and global debate surrounding American involvement in Iraq (Obama 
[2009] 2013). He also explicitly rejected an American claim to Iraqi territory or intent to 
establish military bases, emphasizing his resolve to withdraw troops after providing assistance to 
rebuild infrastructure, a promise that was upheld when troops were withdrawn in late 2011 
(Obama [2009] 2013). President Obama stated, “no system of government can or should be 
imposed upon one nation by any other” and countered assumptions about American nation-
building ambitions in Iraq and the Middle East (Obama [2009] 2013). Towards the conclusion of 
his speech, President Obama declared:  
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“All of us share this world but for a brief moment in time. The question is whether we 
spend that time focused on what pushes us apart, or whether we commit ourselves to an 
effort – a sustained effort – to find common ground, to focus on the future we seek for 
our children, and to respect the dignity of all human beings” (Obama [2009] 2013).  
The address at Cairo was a landmark speech, praised by Americans and Muslims alike. His 
message of tolerance and cooperation was poignant, as was his focus on building trust rather than 
sparking conflict (Obama [2009] 2013). Although President Bush occasionally referenced 
religious tolerance and respect for Islam, President Obama’s multilateral message resonated 
much more strongly within the Muslim world (Obama [2009] 2013).  
In “Constrainment: The Obama Doctrine Defined,” Feith and Cropsey classify this 
speech as “remorseful” in tone, as President Obama apologized for US foreign policy mistakes 
and advocated for the US to “act with less power in the world” (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 13). 
Feith and Cropsey draw direct comparisons between the Bush and Obama Administrations, 
claiming, “the US under Barack Obama is less assertive, less dominant, less power-minded, less 
focused on the American people’s particular interests, and less concerned about preserving US 
freedom of action” (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 12). The Obama Doctrine stipulates that the US 
should not continue the foreign policy trend of dominance and independence in the global 
community, a pattern that has been evident in US engagements abroad since the end of World 
War II (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 12). Feith and Cropsey also argue that President Obama has 
responded to accusations of American aggression and hypocrisy by prioritizing international 
institutions over national interests in order to restrict American power and augment American 
legitimacy in the global community. The Obama Administration’s disavowal of American 
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unilateralism and hegemony represents a stark contrast to the Bush Doctrine and indicates a shift 
in US foreign policy goals and rhetoric.  
Feith and Cropsey attribute the development of the Obama Doctrine to scholars of 
progressive national security literature who criticize US foreign policy (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 
14). This critique is not only directed towards the Bush Administration, but towards years of 
aggressive American power that has fostered anti-American sentiment (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 
14). Feith and Cropsey discuss the theoretical contributions of Samantha Power and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, key scholars who have shaped President Obama’s foreign policy perspective (Feith 
and Cropsey 2011). Samantha Power, one of President Obama’s most trusted advisers, claims 
that international institutions alone are not enough to temper American power (Feith and 
Cropsey 2011: 14). Yet Power claims that unilateral action was not unique to the Bush 
Administration and points to the Clinton Administration’s opposition towards several 
international agreements (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 14). Power encouraged President Obama to 
pursue an apologetic approach to foreign policy and to clarify that he does not personally 
endorse the foreign policy strategies of past administrations (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 14). She 
argues, “the US could remedy the problem only through profound self-criticism and the 
wholesale adoption of new policies” and believed that Obama should “seek pardon for the sins of 
US foreign policy” (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 14).  
Anne-Marie Slaughter, previous head of policy planning at the State Department, 
seconded this approach and encouraged presidential humility, specifically in regards to actions 
after 9/11 (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 14). Slaughter additionally asserted, “the more that America 
is respected and admired in the world, the greater will our diplomatic powers be” and that “it is 
selfish and unproductive for the United States to protect its right and ability to act unilaterally to 
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advance its national interests” (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 15). She highlights the essential paradox 
in American foreign policy: limiting American power and independence will best encourage 
other countries to cooperate with the US and restore respect for Americans (Feith and Cropsey 
2011: 15). These ideas have shaped President Obama’s approach to foreign policy and guided his 
“determination to set precedents and create institutional and legal constraints on the ability of the 
United States to take international action assertively, independently, and in its own particular 
interests” (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 15).  
Feith and Cropsey use US involvement in the UN-mission in Libya as an example of the 
Obama grand strategy (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 12). President Obama demonstrated his intent to 
adhere to UN Security Council recommendations during the Libyan revolution (Feith and 
Cropsey 2011: 12). The President did not volunteer American assistance until both the Arab 
League and the Security Council expressed support for the operation and rejected requests for a 
US-led invasion, ensuring that leadership was immediately passed to NATO (Feith and Cropsey 
2011: 12). The mission additionally had narrow goals and strict limitations (Feith and Cropsey 
2011: 12). President Obama ensured that the UN resolution only aimed to protect Libyan citizens 
and quell violence rather than overthrow Muammar Qaddafi (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 12). This 
mission represents a departure from the foreign policy goals that guided the US mission in Iraq: 
President Obama prioritized international cooperation, exercised restraint in American power 
and adhered to his promise to refrain from active democracy building, whereas President Bush 
disregarded global opinion, asserted American power to preserve US interests and ultimately 
sought to install an American-style democracy in Iraq.  
 Overall, Feith and Cropsey argue that the Obama Doctrine represents a shift in US 
foreign policy tradition (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 18). Despite previous debates between realists 
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and liberalists regarding US foreign policy, both parties fundamentally agreed on the importance 
of American interests, leadership, and power (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 18). The Bush and 
Clinton Administrations reserved the right for independent US action when necessary in order to 
protect American citizens, values and interests (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 18). Yet President 
Obama rejects this historic reliance on unilateral action and focuses on collaboration within 
multilateral institutions and deference to the global community (Feith and Cropsey 2011: 18).  
The Obama Administration’s grand strategy represents a much more significant strategic shift in 
US foreign policy than the Bush Doctrine. President Obama’s foreign policy rhetoric reflects the 
change in grand strategy, as he discards the “rhetoric of identity” as explained by Krebs and 
Lobasz (Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 425). Yet his rhetoric may resonate less with the American 
public, as many of President Obama’s foreign policy critics are uncomfortable with relinquishing 
US power in the global community and atoning for previous foreign policy mistakes (Feith and 
Cropsey 2011). Although President Bush’s impassioned rhetoric, embedded in American 
exceptionalism, ultimately led to imprudent foreign policy decisions, many Americans prefer 
these speeches to President Obama’s more reserved, pragmatic style (Feith and Cropsey 2011). 
Many scholars believed that the Bush Doctrine represented a drastic change, but it is clear from 














This research demonstrates the continuity of realist grand strategies based on strategic 
interests in US foreign policy. The Bush Administration endured criticism after the US did not 
find weapons of mass destruction and later emphasized democracy promotion to justify 
American involvement in Iraq, but initial objectives for preventive war were strategic, rather 
than ideological. The consistency is also evident in the content analysis data conducted on 
President Bush’s foreign policy statements as well as the Clinton, Bush and Obama National 
Security Strategies. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US asserted unilateral ambitions and 
American hegemony in the international arena in order to advance national security interests. 
These trends are consistent throughout the Clinton and Bush Administrations; the Bush Doctrine 
thus did not represent a shift in US foreign policy goals, but in the preventive war measures 
implemented to achieve these objectives. Presidential rhetoric, as embodied in the National 
Security Strategies, has been notably consistent, as ideological values are frequently invoked to 
gain public support for foreign policies. President Bush’s epideictic rhetoric was especially 
compelling, as many Americans supported early foreign policy objectives and perceived the War 
in Iraq as an extension of the War on Terrorism and a response to an attack on American values.  
The Obama Administration’s grand strategy represents a much more significant shift in 
US foreign policy due to President Obama’s devotion to multilateral institutions and critical 
approach to previous US foreign policy decisions. Although the 2010 National Security Strategy 
includes goals of spreading democratic values abroad, President Obama’s speeches are more 
reserved and less bombastic in asserting the universality of American values. Yet this tempered 
rhetoric does not necessarily garner significant public support, as President Obama is often 
criticized for his lack of passion and his undefined foreign policy doctrine. Ideological rhetoric 
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strongly resonates with the American public, regardless of the pragmatism of the foreign policy 
goals described. Future presidential administrations must combine President Bush’s rhetorical 
ability to unite the country with President Obama’s pragmatic foreign policy approach in order to 
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